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1   Executive summary 
REFRESH recent system mapping exercise (Burgos et al. 2017) provided a holistic 
view of the drivers of food waste which have an impact across the whole supply 
chain, such as forecasting errors, over-optimistic projections, lack of data sharing, 
late cancellation, last-minute modifications and order rejections, minimum life on 
receipt (MLoR) criteria, quality specifications, minimum order quantities criteria, 
product over-stocking etc. A bottom-up analysis of five food categories (bread, dairy, 
potatoes/tomatoes, prepared meals and processed meat) showed that these drivers 
are linked to unfair trading practices (UTPs) across the food supply chain. Such prac-
tices can occur at any stage of the supply chain, and at any stage of the contractual 
relationship: during negotiations, when a contract is performed, or in the post-con-
tractual phase. 
Given the cross-cutting nature of these drivers and the complexity of the food sup-
ply chain, a wide diversity of actors with various profiles is involved. In this context, 
REFRESH researchers (Osoro 2016) explored alternative policy measures to reduce 
food loss and waste, such as Voluntary Agreements (VAs), called also “voluntary alli-
ances” or “Frameworks for Action”. Policy researchers investigated the success fac-
tors of VAs to understand how these alternative measures can enhance collaboration 
throughout the supply chain with the common ambition to reduce food waste.  
This report provides a qualitative assessment of two typologies of policy inter-
ventions having an impact on food loss and waste: 
1 Regulations against Unfair Trading Practices (UTPs), which have been identi-
fied as an underlying contributory factor in the generation of food loss and waste 
at different levels of the supply chain; 
2 Voluntary Agreements (VAs) among stakeholders of the food supply chain to 
prevent, reduce and/or valorise food waste. 
Two sets of country-based comparative case studies were developed, namely in 
the UK and Italy for regulations against UTPs, and in the UK and the Netherlands 
for VAs. 
It was found that, for both VAs and regulation against UTPs, a preliminary assess-
ment of underlying food supply chain market structure is important to identify 
the most appropriate policy measures for a specific EU MS. For example, the size and 
number of actors at each level of the food supply chain, the level of market concen-
tration and power imbalance among actors, the existing framework for dealing with 
food waste, the availability of data and funds, etc. should be initially assessed.  
Food supply chains are particularly susceptible to UTPs in MSs where market power 
is concentrated within a few large retailers interacting with a large number of sup-
pliers. Perishable products, such as fresh fruits and vegetables supplied direct from 
primary producers to retailers are particularly at risk due to the time constraints in 
finding alternate outlets.  
As UTPs are primarily a commercial issue, neither the UK nor Italy have directly 
linked the consequences of UTPs to food waste reduction strategies. Apart 
from the underlying influence of UTPs on the effectiveness of a range of direct in-
terventions to address food waste, it is also important to look at solutions for food 
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surpluses generated by UTPs. For instance, redistributing the surpluses that result 
from order cancellations linked to UTPs or ensuring that the “wrongdoer” purchases 
the agri-food product object of the UTPs from the “victim” for a certain period. 
To tackle UTPs, it was found that an effective approach would be the creation of 
an independent authority to investigate any infringement of good trading 
practices, e.g. through an industry code of practice, and, if needed, the introduction 
of sanctions on actors who are found to have not met the standard required 
by the industry code. This authority should receive adequate funding to enable 
thorough investigation of suspected UTPs and have the power to impose a sufficient 
level of fine to act as a deterrent. The UK approach in setting the maximum level of 
fine as a percentage of the wrongdoer’s turnover could become a good practice to 
extend to other countries. 
Preventing retaliation by “wrongdoers” against those raising cases of potential 
UTPs should be a main feature of any system designed to address UTPs. The main 
fear amongst suppliers in bringing forward cases of UTPs is that of being de-listed 
by their retail customers. Allowing confidential claims to be lodged and carrying out 
periodic independent investigations to identify UTPs could be two effective strate-
gies to overcome the “fear factor”. 
Other recommendations identified include adopting a common EU-level definition 
of UTPs in relation to grocery supply, to avoid unequal treatment of comparable 
situations across EU and, furthermore, allow the judgement of cases based on the 
principle of equity. The UK experience also suggests that, besides direct and nation-
based grocery suppliers, indirect and foreign suppliers also need to be protected 
against UTPs. In Italy (where a regulatory framework against UTPs has been es-
tablished only recently) as well as in the EU MSs that have not done it yet, the next 
step would involve the adaptation of the general framework to the specific features 
of their internal market, rather than formally adopting the general EU-level scheme.  
As for VAs, it was found that the level and the nature of funding has a significant 
impact on their lifetime and agendas. For example, VAs receiving governmental/pri-
vate funding are influenced by national/company priorities or budgetary constraints. 
VAs funded by the government are sensitive to changes in political agendas, while 
privately-funded VAs run the risk of being designed according to the largest contrib-
utors’ priorities. VAs that rely on an appropriate balance amongst funding sources 
have a higher chance of being stable and effective. To ensure a VA’s relevance, sig-
natories must benefit from their participating, either financially or in terms of 
heightened visibility. In addition, VAs should establish ambitious yet realistic 
targets, achievable by their signatories, and robustness and transparency of data 
reporting should be forefront to ensure the credibility of the initiatives. 
Another interesting finding is that VAs can be implemented alongside compulsory 
legislation or provide an alternative to it. An advantage of them, compared to 
legislation, is that they can be designed and adapted relatively quickly depending on 
political goals related to food waste. Furthermore, since a VA’s participants tend to 
be involved also in its design, VAs adopt more realistic targets and a more concrete 
approach than legislation, and stakeholders tend to approach them with a more con-
structive attitude. The role of a third party is crucial in managing a VA, notably 
to facilitate actor accession to it, ensure confidentiality of data, supervise and even-
tually nudge compliance with the agreement. This third party can also ensure a wide 
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representation of actors from the whole supply chain. This, in turn, is essential to 
tackle the issue of food waste from farm to fork. 
Last but not least, VAs and UTPs were found to be interlinked: VAs can be an 
effective tool to explore the effects of regulation against UTPs and assess 
actors’ readiness to avoid market power abuse. VAs are also likely to be more 
effective in developing whole chain solutions to food waste when UTPs are less of 
an issue between primary producers and their retail markets. If primary producers 
are poorly represented within VAs (which may in itself reflect UTPs within the supply 
chain), this will in turn reduce the effectiveness of VAs.  
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2   Introduction and objectives 
This report aims at providing a qualitative assessment of two sets of country-
based comparative case studies illustrating the simultaneous interaction of pol-
icies addressing food waste, directly or indirectly, in select EU MSs, namely the UK, 
Italy and the Netherlands. The case studies will deal with: 
1 The regulatory framework against Unfair Trading Practices (hereafter, UTPs) 
that lead to the generation of food waste at different levels of the supply chain. 
Such trading practices can occur at any stage of the supply chain, and at any stage 
of the contractual relationship: they can be imposed during negotiations, when the 
contract is performed, or in the post-contractual phase. It has been pointed out that 
these practices are a systemic driver of food waste1 (Burgos et al. 2017). In the 
UK, the supermarket watchdog “Groceries Code Adjudicator” identifies best policy 
practices to tackle the gaps in bargaining power between supermarkets and their 
suppliers2. The objective of this case study is to compare the UK with another EU 
MS, namely Italy, to assess the effectiveness of the policy mix built around UTPs 
focused on food waste.  
2 Voluntary Agreements (hereafter, VAs) for preventing, reducing, and/or val-
orising food waste. 
Voluntary Agreements are defined by the REFRESH policy brief “Voluntary Agree-
ments as a collaborative solution for food waste reduction” (Burgos et al., 2018) 
as “Self-determined commitments or pacts with qualitative and quantitative objec-
tives, developed by private entities and/or other stakeholders in consultation with 
their signatories. They are used as alternative courses of action to traditional leg-
islation, can be piloted by government officials, businesses or other actors, and can 
be used in addition to, or independently from existing legislation”. 
This report provides a comparative analysis of how such agreements fit in the na-
tional policy mix in the UK and the Netherlands, and of how the mix impacts on 
food waste. The UK’s Courtauld Commitments (hereafter, CCs) are analysed in the 
framework of their policy mix and compared to what is now the Taskforce for Cir-
cular Economy in Food (hereafter, TCEF) in the Netherlands. 
For each policy intervention, the two country case studies were selected so as to 
achieve a certain diversity in terms of factors most relevant to UTPs and VAs:  
1 The existing level of commitment to reduce food waste;  
2 The status of existing food waste reduction strategies; 
3 Institutional setting and legal system/tradition; 
4 Food supply chain governance and market structure. 
                                       
1 http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_34/SR_FOOD_WASTE_EN.pdf [Accessed 
06.07.2017]. 
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/survey-shows-groceries-code-adjudicator-is-making-a-dif-
ference [Accessed 06.07.2017]. 
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3   Methodology:  Comparative  policy  case 
studies  
The design of the comparative policy case studies will follow the methodological rec-
ommendations by Yin (2003) and Scholz and Tietje (2002), detailed in Appendix 1. 
Additionally, to increase the construct and internal validity of the case study design, 
the work of Bardach (2002) “A practical guide for policy analysis: the eightfold path 
to more effective problem solving”, which suggests an analytical process to assess 
public policy interventions, will be used. Although case studies will adopt the frame-
work defined in Appendix 1, a certain flexibility will be allowed as long as they abide 
by the protocol defined below. 
A core element of the REFRESH policy case studies is their comparative approach. 
Comparative analyses provide important insights to better understand policy pro-
cesses, learn how (and why) policies vary or have different effects in different con-
texts, and what lessons may or may not be “transferred” across borders. Therefore, 
after analysing UTPs and VAs within single countries, comparative analyses will be 
carried out on the results. 
To ensure consistency, all case studies will follow the structure defined below: 
 Definition of the problem addressed (UTPs or VAs); 
 Identification of the causes (drivers) and of the consequences; 
 Identification of relevant stakeholders (firms, consumers, policymakers, etc.); 
 Identification of the main policy interventions implemented and of other policies 
impacting on the field; 
 Identification of the resources devoted and of the financial impacts of these in-
terventions, where available; 
 Evaluation of the coherence and synergy among national-level policies impact-
ing on the field; 
 Evaluation of the coherence and synergy with EU-level policies impacting on the 
field; 
 Identification of the key challenges in designing and implementing existing/po-
tential interventions; 
 Identification of the factors of success/positive synergies. 
More details on the research protocol are provided in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Research protocol for the case studies. 




Which is the problem that the 
policy intervention is address-
ing / should address? What are 
the boundaries of the problem? 
Problem definition; quantifica-
tion and relevance of the prob-
lem at economic, environmental 




data (if available). 





quences of the 
problem 
Which are the drivers (institu-
tional, etc.) leading to the gen-
eration of the problem? What 
are the consequences deriving 
from the problem? 
Identification of the causes; 
identification of the conse-
quences; elaboration of a prob-




For VAs, describe 
drivers and conse-
quences of the lack 
of coordination.  
Relevant stake-
holders  
Which are the groups (e.g. 
large retailers, producers, pro-
cessors, small retailers, institu-
tions, etc.) or individual (e.g. 
consumers) who can affect or 
be affected by the problem? 
Stakeholders; type of involve-
ment; interest in the issue, in-
fluence / power in the policy 
process; resources held (money, 





affected by the is-
sue; VA: stakehold-




Which type of intervention was 
/ can be designed to address 
the problem? Are there any in-
terventions / regulations im-
pacting indirectly on it? 
Policy type, rationale of the pol-
icy, intervention mechanism, ob-




of the legislation. 
When no direct inter-
vention was imple-
mented, describe the 
policy framework 
and indirect impacts. 
Resources and 
financial impact 
What investments did the gov-
ernment or other decision-
makers carry out to implement 
the policy intervention? What 
are the impacts/envisaged im-
pacts of the intervention? Are 
the outcomes coherent with 
the objectives stated? 
Cost of the investment to imple-
ment the intervention; eco-
nomic, environmental and social 
impacts. 
Literature review; 




tors from different 
sectors; expert 
opinions. 
When no direct inter-
vention was imple-
mented, or outcomes 
are not known, focus 
on costs of the prob-
lem and potential 
policy impacts. 
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Is there a wider policy frame-
work or a specific national 
strategy within which the inter-
vention is embedded / could be 
embedded? Are there any 
other policy interventions in re-
lated fields that could scale up 
or limit its effectiveness? 
Relevant national policies; co-
herence with other national poli-
cies; potential limitations gener-
ated by other policies; potential 
synergies with other policies to 
scale up the impact of the inter-
vention; way the intervention (if 
any) and other policies interact. 
Literature review; 
desk research; 





When no direct inter-
vention was imple-
mented, or outcomes 
are not known, focus 
on the aggregate im-
pact on the issue of 






Are there any EU interventions 
impact on the field? Is the na-
tional-level policy intervention 
/ policy framework coherent 
with EU-level policies in that 
field, or related fields (i.e. Cir-
cular Economy)? What EU poli-
cies (if any) could scale up or 
limit its effectiveness? 
Relevant EU policies / strategy; 
coherence with EU policies / 
strategies; potential limitations 
generated by EU policies; poten-
tial synergies with EU policies to 
scale up the impact; way the in-









List both the EU poli-
cies / strategies aim-
ing at addressing the 
problem, and the 
policies fostering it 







What are the main challenges 
encountered (or that could be 
encountered) in the concep-
tion, design and implementa-
tion of the intervention? 
Financial challenges; social chal-







When no direct inter-
vention was imple-
mented (e.g. against 
UTP in Italy), show 
potential threats. 
Factors of suc-
cess and key 
learnings 
What are the factors of success 
(or potential factors of success) 
of the interventions? If already 
implemented, what key learn-
ing can be derived from the 
implementation of the inter-
vention and from its impacts?  
Financial factors; place-related 
factors; social factors; implica-






When no direct inter-
vention was imple-
mented (e.g. to ad-
dress UTP in Italy), 
describe potential 
opportunities. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
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4   Case  study  1:  Unfair  Trading  Practices 
and effect on food waste 
4.1 Unfair trading practices: definition and context 
Although UTPs concern primarily the commercial transactions among different play-
ers along the food supply chain, they may result in food waste, or lessen the impact 
of policies specifically aimed at reducing food waste. While some frameworks adopted 
to address UTPs do not explicitly engage with the problem of food waste, food waste 
is often an acknowledged by-product of UTPs. For example, a 2016 European Par-
liament briefing states that “unpredictable changes of contract terms may lead to 
overproduction and result in unnecessary food waste” (EC 2016b, p. 4). Moreover, 
the UK’s Groceries Code Adjudicator Christine Tacon publicly made the link between 
UTPs and food waste in November 2017 (The Grocer 2017).  
UTPs are defined by the EC Green Paper (2013, p. 3) as: 
“…practices which grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, 
are contrary to good faith and fair deal ing and are unilaterally im-
posed by one trading partner on its counterparty.  The European 
Commission has identified four key categories of UTPs:  
1.  one party should not unduly or unfairly shift its own costs or 
entrepreneurial  risks to the other party;  
2.  one party should not ask the other party for advantages or 
benefits of any kind without performing a service related to the 
advantage or benefit asked;  
3.  one party should not make unilateral and/or retroactive 
changes to a contract, unless the contract specifically al lows 
for it  under fair conditions;  
4.  there should be no unfair termination of a contractual relat ion-
ship or unjustif ied threat of termination of a contractual rela-
tionship.” (EC 2016, p. 2).  
Within the food supply chain, UTPs are challenging for several reasons. Firstly, be-
cause of their commercial impact. The EC Inception Impact Assessment (2017) 
predicts that action to address UTPs could increase disposable farm income, make 
farming – particularly smaller operators – more attractive to investment, attract 
more newcomers to the farming profession, and boost rural employment and in-
clusive growth in rural areas (EC 2017a, p. 7-8).  
The impact of UTP is difficult to quantify, in part because the impact data are not 
collected, either at MS or EU level. Lack of data is also part of the problem – infor-
mation asymmetries are identified by the EC Inception Impact Assessment as con-
tributing to farmers’ weak position in the supply chain (EC 2017a, p. 4). 
In addition to the commercial impact, typically on smaller producers in the food 
supply chain, and the resulting social impact in terms of increased uncertainty in 
rural livelihoods, some UTPs can also generate food loss and waste. For example: 
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 The absence of a written contract, or unilateral imposition or modification of terms 
and conditions of a contract, can result in food waste where the buyer makes last 
minute changes or cancellations to volumes previously ordered. In the case of 
highly perishable produce, such as soft fruits or vegetables – which cannot be 
stored and must be processed within 24-48 hours from harvesting – it is partic-
ularly challenging, as suppliers have a very limited time to find other buyers.  
 Even without unfair breaches or impositions of contracts, imbalanced bargaining 
power may result in food waste where suppliers aim for very high product avail-
ability (overproduction), in order not to run the risk of losing business. Where 
they cannot then find a market for this product, food waste may be the result. 
 In their research with primary producers, exporters, importers and other supply 
chain intermediaries3, Colbert (2017) and Colbert and Stuart (2015)4 found that 
cosmetic specifications are being used to restrict market access when demand 
is lower than supply: when pre-arranged contractual supply to retailers does 
not match consumer demand the stringency of application of cosmetic standards 
is ramped up as part of a business response to the excess supply. 
 Minimum life on receipt (MLoR) criteria have been used in a similar way, as an 
excuse to reject produce that the buyer has decided he cannot sell because of 
falling demand or inaccurate forecasting. Retail distribution and stock managers 
report applying MLoR criteria arbitrarily to respond to commercial drivers and 
bonus incentives when managing stock (GSC survey 2017). 
 Since many commercial intermediators or agri-food processors do not take part 
in the production process, and are thus not aware on what happens upstream, 
they are likely to implement UTPs. 
Thus, addressing UTPs has the potential to reduce both unfair commercial impacts 
on suppliers, and to address many different causes of food loss and waste and their 
resulting environmental impacts.  
UTPs occur in the food supply chain because of significant power imbalances be-
tween different sides of the market, particularly between larger buyers, such as the 
major European retail corporations, and smaller suppliers, such as individual farm-
ers, small cooperatives, or overseas suppliers. The concentration of the food retail 
sector varies across the EU (Figure 1), with traditional grocery markets still im-
portant in some MSs (e.g. Greece and Italy). Where retail markets are highly con-
centrated, the power imbalance between retailers and suppliers can result in the 
imposition of unfair conditions on players with low levels of power. The lack of an 
                                       
3 Colbert’s research is based on survey data from 141 UK-based supply chain stakeholders (including 
primary producers, produce inspectors, insurers, academics, importers, exporters and others), and 
semi-structured face-to-face or phone interviews with 70 of these. Thirty-four (34) Peruvian and 
Senegalese primary producers, and two producer associations were visited and participated in semi-
structured interviews. Twelve (12) formal interviews were conducted in the fresh produce area of a 
major European port, all of whom requested the name of the port or even country would not be 
disclosed. Information was also provided by 10 South African primary producers. See Colbert (2017, 
p. 9) Methodology Section for more details. 
4 Colbert and Stuart (2014) carried out primary research in Kenya: 21 interviews were conducted, of 
which ten were with farmers, two with day labourers, and nine with exporters. More detail on p. 8 
of the report. 
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inhibiting, trans-national regulatory framework, or of an adequate system of inves-
tigation and redress at the MS level, allows these drivers to result in continual and 
high levels of UTPs across multiple different areas of the food supply chain.  
As a reflection of this weak position of farmers, the long-term trend in the distri-
bution of value-added in the European food chain since 1995 has been a steady 
decline in their share (Figure 2) relative to other players5. The interpretation of this 
trend is complex, and includes changes in CAP payments, and a general shift towards 
a greater share of higher added value food products (e.g., pre-prepared/conven-
ience foods). However, over this period, greater market concentration has also oc-
curred within the retail sector, with most European food purchased by 110 retailer 
buying desks from approximately three million farmers6 (see Figure 3). 
Figure 1. Overall profile of market concentration across selected EU MSs. 
  
Source: Analysis for Refresh WP3, Planet Retail, European Commission 2014. 
Figure 2. Distribution of value-added in the EU food supply chain (1995–20117). 
 
Source: Derived from European Commission ‘A better functioning food supply chain in Europe’ 2009, 
Commissioner Hogan response to European Parliamentary question, February 27th, 2015.  
                                       
5 Report of the Agricultural Markets Task Force (2016).  
6 Wageningen (2012, p 116). 
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Figure 3. The supply-chain funnel in Europe. 
 
Source: UNIDO, Humphrey and Memedovic 2006, Global Value Chains in the Agrifood Sector (original 
source and data from a presentation dated 2002)8. 
The EU has been discussing UTPs and responses to them since 2009 (EC 2017a, p. 
2), and is currently working on a full impact assessment of future initiatives to im-
prove the functioning of the EU’s food chain, due to be published in the first quarter 
of 2018. A public consultation that ran from August to November 2017 found that 
90% of respondents agreed or partially agreed that UTPs exist, citing examples 
that related to late payment periods and unilateral and retroactive changes to con-
tracts9. 
One challenge with the regulation and prevention UTPs is that, as the European 
Parliament’s 2016 resolution states, “‘unfairness’ in the food supply chain is difficult 
to translate into infringement of current competition law” (European Parliament 
2016b). One of the causes of UTPs is, thus, the absence of effective legislative con-
trol, stemming in part from differences in definition and responses at national level, 
and in part from the unique nature of the food supply chain (Stefanelli and Marsden 
2012, p. 1).  
4.1.1 UTPs identified as food waste drivers in REFRESH systems maps 
Evidence in the form of site visits and interviews were collected as part of the “bot-
tom-up” approach to mapping food waste drivers within food supply chains (Burgos 
et al. 2017). This exercise was carried out for a selection of food products’ supply 
chains from the UK, France, Germany, Sweden and Italy. These included products 
                                       
8 Grievink, J.-W., “The Changing Face of the Global Food Industry”, presentation made at the OECD 
Conference, The Hague, 6 February 2003, available at http://ernaehrungsdenkwerkstatt.de/filead-
min/user_upload/EDWText/TextElemente/Handel/OECD_Food_Trade_Business_Trends-
GrievinkPPT.pdf [Accessed 19.12.2017].  
9 European Commission, “Strong majority of stakeholders back European Union action to support 
farmers in food chain”, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/strong-majority-stakeholders-
back-european-union-action-support-farmers-food-chain_en [Accessed 08.02.2018]. 
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of different levels of complexity (potatoes, bread, dairy, processed meat/poultry, 
and pre-cooked meals). The analysis confirmed the view that: 
 UTPs are linked to more perishable, shorter shelf-life products; 
 Examples of food waste drivers relating to possible retailer/producer UTPs within 
the systems mapping driver classification are: last minute changes to orders, use 
of quality specifications to artificially reduce agreed orders on quality grounds; 
 UTPs are linked to and sometimes caused by poor sharing of information/demand 
forecasting, and to the phenomenon of demand amplification.  
Table 2. Systems mapping: identification of drivers with possible links to UTPs. 
Food product category 
Examples of whole supply chain drivers linked 
to retail-producer interactions  
Bread (DE, FR, UK) 
Retail/bakery take-back 
rules in Germany may re-
quire bakery to be respon-
sible for unsold product, in-
cluding cost of disposal 
MLoR criteria (% of date 
life) for industrial bread set 
very high in UK compared 
with France & Germany 
Dairy (milk) (SE, UK) 
MLoR criteria set by retailers: inefficient ‘top-up’ batches 
needed to maintain record of order fulfilment in-full & on 
time 
Potatoes/tomatoes (FR, IT, 
SE, UK) 
Includes both traditional and modern retail uses: “indus-
trial tomatoes” may demand higher specifications than 
those sent as fresh product to retail due to the require-
ments of highly automated processing equipment; “flex-
ing” of quality spec to manage surplus when high yields, 




Late cancellation/changes to orders may result in loss of 
ingredients already prepared to meet original order 
Processed meat/poultry (IT, 
UK) 
Retailer quality specifications too stringent: economic loss 
to down-grade markets; risk of unpredictable seasonal 
meat/poultry products not shared between retailer and 
producer, “demand amplification” in advance of predicted 
demand peaks (e.g. barbecue meat cuts in summer) 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on D3.1 “Systems maps and analytical framework”. 
Overall it was found that more perishable products were more often wasted within 
the supply chain, because of supply and demand imbalances and poor information 
sharing and the limited scope for finding alternate markets as a consequence of 
perishability and short life. Indeed, the mapping exercise confirmed that the supply 
and demand imbalance is an important food waste driver in the food supply chain. 
However, the factors behind this imbalance that were recorded by the assessment 
were complex, and included forecasting errors, over-optimistic projections for in-
creased product demand, associated with retail promotional offers. Forecasting 
practices were reported to be often too complex, and to fail in linking directly to 
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consumer sales, production scheduling and farmers. With poor information sharing 
and erratic peaks and troughs in demand, a small increase in the forecast demand 
at the retail stage can result in ‘demand amplification’ further back in the supply 
chain as competing suppliers of the same product amplify the real demand. This 
phenomenon results in rapid food surplus and waste and is symptomatic of poor 
process integration and information across supply chain members. The costs of the 
resulting surplus fall on suppliers, rather than on retailers. 
The following of this chapter compares the regulatory approaches to UTPs adopted 
by the UK and Italy, respectively. These two EU MS provide contrasting food supply 
chain market structures, as well as different legal system/traditions, based on com-
mon and civil law, respectively. Hence, it can be expected that the way to address 
UTPs has taken different pathways. 
4.2 Unfair trading practices in the UK 
The first case study is concerned with the UK’s policy response to the problem of 
UTPs, and the linkage of such practices to food waste; therefore, some examination 
of the UK stakeholders, market structure and the overall context of UTPs in relation 
to the food supply chain is relevant.  
4.2.1 The food supply chain and food waste in the UK 
The food and drink supply chain involves a multitude of different stakeholders de-
pending on the product type, the nature of its processing, the range of ingredients 
used, and the role of any intermediaries across different supply chain stages. Er-
ror! Reference source not found. provides an overview of the main interactions, 
making the distinction between direct and indirect relationships that exist between 
suppliers and retailers.  
The main stakeholders can be defined by supply chain stage and sector. At the 
base of the supply chain, the farmers include those supplying the UK grocery sector 
from within the UK, from other EU Member States, and from the wider world. Based 
on the farm-gate value of unprocessed food, in 2015 52% of the food consumed in 
the UK was supplied by UK-based producers; 29% was sourced from other EU MSs, 
with Africa, Asia, North and South America each supplying a 4% share (Defra 2017). 
Farmers in England and Wales are represented by the National Farmers Union (NFU), 
with more than 55,000 farmer members. NFU Scotland and Ulster FU represent 
farmers in the rest of the UK. The NFU carries out surveys amongst its members, 
including on issues such as UTPs. These surveys found that one in seven members 
of the NFU is facing UTPs. 
“The NFU wil l  continue to work for Brit ish farmers on unfair trad-
ing practices and wi l l push for the culture change so badly needed 
in the food supply chain.” (NFU President, Poli t ico Agriculture and 
Food Summit 2017) 
The NFU was instrumental in lobbying for change within the UK on UTP issues and 
supports a strengthening of the existing measures to tackle UTPs. 
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Figure 4. Direct and indirect suppliers within grocery supply chain. 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
The Food and Drink Federation and the British Retail Consortium are the trade bod-
ies for the food and drink manufacturers and for the retailers respectively. The 
BRC’s views on UTPs reflect those of their membership and were stated in evidence 
submitted to the EC’s consultation on the Green Paper on UTPs in 2013: 
“the ultimate interest of consumers should be the priority of pol-
icy makers and that ‘hard bargaining’ is not itself unfair and ult i-
mately good for consumers and good for supply chain innovation” 
(BRC 2013).  
About two thirds of UK’s agricultural produce is bought by members of the Food and 
Drink Federation, that represents the food and drink manufacturing sector and in-
cludes 6,815 food businesses employing 400,000 people. On behalf of their mem-
bership, they support firm action on UTP’s in the UK in relation to the supply of 
products to the retail sector. 
The Competition and Markets Authority is the UK’s economy-wide competition au-
thority, formed after the merger of the Competition Commission and the Office of 
Fair Trading in 2014. It is an independent non-ministerial department with offices 
across the UK with responsibility for investigation of anti-competitive practices, 
conduct of market studies where there may be competition issues. Its powers are 
supported by legislation under the Enterprise Act 2002, including the power to in-
vestigate individual businesses to determine whether they have breached UK or EU 
prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position 
under the Competition Act 1998, which is the UK’s legislation that harmonises with 
EU competition policy (CMA Guidance, 15th July 2013). 
The two government departments with the most involvement with food and food 
supply issues are the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) 
and Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). Defra’s remit 
includes the UK Government’s policy on food and agriculture and is a relatively small 
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spending department (GBP 3.1bn in 2016/17). BEIS’s remit includes the develop-
ment and delivery of a comprehensive industrial strategy and leading the govern-
ment’s relationship with business. In the recently published Industrial Strategy 
White Paper, it was announced the creation of a Food and Drink Sector Council to 
support the industry’s supply chain. 
UK market situation 
The UK has a high degree of market concentration with the “top 4” retailers holding 
70% of the market by turnover and the “top 3”, 55% (Figure 5). The largest grocery 
retailers in the UK are Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Tesco, with the remaining 
market largely occupied by “discount” supermarkets, such as Lidl and Aldi, as well 
as smaller supermarkets such as The Cooperative and Waitrose (Kantar 2017). This 
market concentration has led to retailers wielding significant power over the market 
and their suppliers. The NFU, among others, has detailed some UTPs that are a by-
product of this imbalance in market power, including a lack of notice of a price 
change, unreasonable notice of specification changes, and unreasonable contract 
terms (NFU 2017).  
The food supply chain of the UK is also highly globalised. Therefore, it is critical to 
include foreign suppliers in the analysis of the impacts on food waste of UK actors’ 
UTPs. The UK imports 63.5% of the domestic fresh fruit and vegetable consump-
tion, comprising 54% of vegetables and 17% of total fruit consumption. Imports 
from outside the EU have growth, partly reflecting the sourcing of non-native foods, 
such as pineapples, melons and avocados. Hence, by volume of produce sold, most 
actors are excluded by focusing only on UK-based suppliers.  
Figure 5. “Top 3” retailers: market share (%) by turnover. 
 
Source: Various sources, including Euromonitor, Retail Planet and Kantar, mainly 2012-2015 data. 
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Farm level in the food supply chain 
Global supply 
Feedback, a UK organisation which works to address the causes of food waste, has 
developed a portfolio of evidence on the role of UTPs in generating food waste.  While 
several other UK organisations have examined the role of UTPs in damaging small 
farmers’ interests, both in the UK and overseas, Feedback is one of the few organ-
isations to directly research market practices in the groceries market as a cause of 
waste. Looking at the direct global supply chain into the UK, Feedback’s investiga-
tions (2015 and 2017) have established a conclusive link between UTPs and food 
waste in the production sector, due to last minute alteration or cancellation of or-
ders, unpredictable fluctuations in demand, and buyer requirements for producers 
to guarantee production volumes, leading to overproduction to guarantee produc-
ers can meet their orders.  
“We, as farmers, have gone through this challenge before where 
the exporter comes to us and tells us that the market across has 
cancelled the orders. By that time, you have harvested, and what 
happens therefore is that we have much of our produce left be-
hind and, yet, we have already had losses in terms of operational 
costs. When an order is cancelled we have a problem as a family. 
I have children in school who are depending on this money, who 
are being sent home for fees. They come here crying and by that 
time I’m helpless because the order has been cancelled, my pro-
duce is with me, I have casual labour, I have people in the family, 
and other obl igations. Once in a while I borrow money from finan-
cial inst itutions –  they are also on my neck… I’m subjected to al l 
of this just because of an order cancellation that is not my fault.” 
(Quote from a Kenyan mange tout farmer, in Feedback 2015, p.  
16). 
Feedback (2015) found that on average 30% of produce was being rejected at 
farm-level in the Kenyan horticultural exports sector. 
UK-based farmers  
Qualitative research with farmers in the UK found that a range of supermarket prac-
tices impact on food waste at farm level, including order cancellations, poor com-
munication, inaccurate forecasting by retailers, and inconsistent application of cos-
metic standards governing how food must look to be accepted by supermarket buy-
ers (Feedback 2018). UTPs are exacerbated by a climate of “fear” due to the power 
imbalances between suppliers and retailers. Feedback’s (2017) report into supply 
chains included interviews with insurers working with suppliers to major retailers. 
The following quote with one insurer crystallises the issue of the climate of fear:  
“The reason we are not giving  you any names is [because of] a 
cl imate of fear that, absolutely, permeates the industry. In fact, 
the clients that we asked to take part in your research are so 
worried about repercussions that they have not only refused, but 
pushed back against us taking part in the research. Unfair trading 
by supermarkets affects us too, of course. As an insurance com-
pany, we are expected by clients to defend their interests. How-
ever, we do not issue claims and challenges when we bel ieve food 
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is rejected unfairly, because our cl ients fear being delisted or los-
ing business and instruct us not to claim. This in turn damages 
our relationship with cl ients, who simultaneously are reluctant to 
chal lenge behaviour and, conversely, are asking us as insurers 
‘what do I pay you for if  you can’t pay out for losses on cargo?’. 
We are stuck in the middle, managing relationships within a com-
pletely broken market.”  
When produce does not meet cosmetic standards, but global supply is low, or de-
mand is high, supermarkets are reported to become more flexible with their out-
grading and rejections, so that rejections show a seasonal cycle. The inconsistent 
application of cosmetic specifications was a phenomenon also found in Feedback's 
(2017) research into international supply chains, with a European fresh produce 
insurer also saying:  
“It ’s evident that supermarkets reject food when they have under-
sold a product - this is well-known behaviour within the sector. 
And at times of year, when they need the stock, they wil l  be less 
scrupulous and reject less. This is total ly inconsistent and, as we 
know from inspections, not related to the quality of the product 
itself. We know it is to do with supply and demand.”   
A Peruvian onion producer to UK retailers noted the same con-
cern: “If prices are high then the market wil l  take anything. If 
they are low due to oversupply, then cosmetics are enforced.”  
Feedback’s findings are consistent with the view of the NFU. In testimony to Par-
liamentary committees, similar views were expressed. Lord Whitty (2013) states:  
‘ ‘Although it  (GCA) does not expl icit ly deal with waste, it  does 
deal with the nature of the contract, which seems to transfer the 
risk—this would be the NFU’s view—back down the supply chain 
rather heavily. If you over-specify or if  there are too many 
changes, either in quality control or in volume, effectively the risk 
is taken by the farmer.’ ’ 10 
4.2.2 Overview of the policy: the Groceries Supply Code of Practice 
The policy intervention in response to UTPs that this case study will consider is the 
establishment in the UK of the Groceries Supply Code of Practice (GSCOP), and 
the monitoring body, the Groceries Code Adjudicator, as an evolution from an 
earlier voluntary approach called the UK Supermarket Code of Practice (SCOP). 
The SCOP was first drawn up in 2001 by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT – now part 
of the Competitions and Market Authorities (CMA), to address concerns identified 
by the UK Competition Commission (also now part of the CMA) in relation to the 
behaviour of five grocery retailers towards their suppliers. In overseeing compliance 
with the SCOP, the OFT continued to receive complaints about competition matters 
                                       
10 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-d/food-waste-preven-
tion/food-waste-evidence-volume.pdf [Accessed 06.02.2018]. 
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and the effectiveness of the voluntary SCOP. In 2005, in response to these com-
plaints, the OFT commissioned a compliance audit, which ultimately, after repre-
sentations by NGOs and other industry bodies in the UK, resulted in the referral to 
the Competition Commission for a full investigation. The 2008 investigation led 
to the recommendation that a mandatory code be established, the GSCOP, and to 
seek undertakings from retailers to establish an ombudsman. If retailers did not 
commit to an ombudsman, the Competition Commission recommended that the 
government step in to establish an ombudsman, and to provide it with powers to 
levy financial penalties. However, this code proved to be insufficient to combat 
UTPs in the UK market, with many suppliers continuing to report problems in their 
relationships with retailers.  
The Competition Commission identified two principal areas of concern. The first was 
around the strong position of some retailers in local markets, and barriers to 
entry for new or competing retailers. The second one concerned “the transfer of 
excessive risk and unexpected costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers through 
various supply chain practices” which “if unchecked, are expected to have a detri-
mental effect on consumers through, in large part, poorer-quality products and less 
product innovation” (Competition Commission 2008, p. 176).  
The Commission first proposed a strengthened Code of Practice, with an independ-
ent ombudsman, then in 2009 recommended that this ombudsman should be es-
tablished on a statutory basis, due to the failure to reach agreement with super-
markets on a voluntary process of implementation.  
In 2010, a new government published a draft bill to “proactively enforce the Grocery 
Supply Code of Practice and curb abuses of power.” The Groceries Code Adjudicator 
Act was passed in 2013, and the Grocery Code Adjudicator (GCA) began life on 24 
June 2013, presided over by Christine Tacon as the Adjudicator in relation to the 
application of the GSCOP to the ten largest UK grocery retailers (Seely 2015). 
The GCA monitors, encourages compliance with and enforces the Code, including 
the following range of supply chain practices: making payments on time; no vari-
ations to supply agreements without notice; compensation payments for forecast-
ing errors; no charges for shrinkage or wastage; restrictions on listing fees, mar-
keting costs and delisting. However, it does not cover price setting, food safety, or 
labelling issues (GCA, June 2014).  
Most significantly, GSCOP defines supplier as “any person carrying on (or actively 
seeking to carry on) a business in the direct supply to any retailer of groceries for 
resale in the UK and includes any such person established anywhere in the world.” 
The Code therefore only applies to direct supplier-retailer transactions (Figure 4) 
and not those that involve intermediaries, but does extend to direct suppliers out-
side of the UK. The GCA cannot adjudicate on individual complaints from suppliers, 
but it can launch investigations into practices raised by suppliers.  
One such investigation was into Tesco plc, after the retailer revealed a profit over-
statement of EUR 283 million (GBP 250 million) in September 2014. The adjudicator 
found that Tesco had unreasonably delayed payments to suppliers, often for pro-
longed periods of time, and made five recommendations to improve practices (GCA, 
January 2016). The NFU cautiously welcomed the GCA’s response, whilst urging 
prompt action to comply on behalf of Tesco and urging the extension of the GCA’s 
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remit to cover indirect suppliers (NFU, 26 January 2016). Other observers, includ-
ing Feedback and other members of the GCA Network, have repeatedly called for 
the remit of the Adjudicator to be extended, in order to cover indirect suppliers. In 
evidence submitted to a food waste enquiry in 2016 by the parliamentary select 
committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (EFRA), Feedback argued: 
“The GCA has been effective in reducing the prevalence of UTPs 
between retailers and their direct suppl iers, yet 62% of suppliers 
sti l l  say they experience issues with UTPs. Since the GCA is l im-
ited to regulating the relationship between retai lers and their di-
rect (first-tier) suppliers, indirect suppliers are not protected, de-
spite experiencing UTPs. Direct suppliers are fearful of raising 
complaints with the GCA in case of persecution by their retail cl i-
ents, and so transfer the risk and cost of UTPs up the chain.” 
(Feedback 2016).  
Supplier attitudes 
Each year the GCA publishes the results of a supplier survey, which reveals shifts 
and trends in perceptions of the occurrence of UTPs, adherence to the code and the 
impacts of the adjudicators work.  
2014 survey 
The inaugural survey found that, of those suppliers surveyed, awareness of and 
familiarity with the Code varied widely, with 49% of direct suppliers “quite familiar” 
with the Code, compared to 33% of indirect suppliers. Regarding the impact of the 
Code and the GCA, only 19% of direct suppliers felt that retailer practice had im-
proved, with 14% of direct suppliers and 27% of indirect suppliers feeling practice 
has worsened. One implication could be that in complying with the Code for the 
direct suppliers, retailers bore down more harshly on their indirect suppliers who 
remained unprotected by the Adjudicator. Four out of five suppliers had had a Code 
related issue, with half unsure whether they would raise an issue with the GCA. 
2015 survey 
In 2015 the number of respondents to the survey doubled, with the extra responses 
mainly coming from direct suppliers. Code understanding was roughly the same, 
with small and micro suppliers the least likely to have a good understanding of the 
Code. The percentage of direct suppliers who would consider raising an issue with 
the GCA increased from 38% to 47%. Those who would not raise an issue with the 
GCA said this was mainly because they feared retribution from retailers or they 
didn’t think the GCA would be able to do anything. The main success factors sup-
pliers identified were an increasingly collaborative culture between retailers and 
suppliers, meaning it was easier to raise issues with retailers directly. The higher 
percentage than in 2014 who said they would consider raising an issue with the 
GCA is an indicator that trust was increasing in the institution and process. 
2016 survey 
The 2016 survey broadly found increasing levels of awareness and understanding 
of the Code and the GCA’s remit across suppliers, with a jump in both good under-
standing of the Code and good understanding of the GCA’s role and responsibilities 
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(up 7%). For example, there was a rise in the number of direct suppliers that un-
dertook training in the Code (29% to 35%) – following a GCA campaign urging sup-
pliers to “get trained”, as well as a strong preference among suppliers for online 
training tutorials. Suppliers also reported an increase in knowledge about how to 
contact the Code Compliance Officers at each retailer. There was a fall in the num-
ber of direct suppliers saying they have raised an issue with a retailer in the past 
12 months (17% to 13%) and a further fall in the number of suppliers saying they 
had experienced an issue in the past year, down to 62% (from 79% in 2014). One 
area of disappointment for the Adjudicator was no change in the proportion of sup-
pliers prepared to bring information to the GCA (GCA, 27 June 2016). 
Figure 6. GCA Survey Key Trends 2014- 2017. 
 
Source: Adapted from Groceries Code Adjudicator annual report, 2017. 
2017 survey 
The positive trends in increased awareness of the Code and the GCA continued in 
2017, and awareness among suppliers outside the UK also grew. However, fear of 
retribution remained a factor, with nearly half (47%) of suppliers saying it would 
prevent them raising an issue. One supplier noted the aspect of retailer practice 
with the most negative effect as: “Forecasting of stock – huge swings in demanded 
volumes and little, if any, responsibility from the retailer for the excess stock left 
behind” (YouGov 2017). 
In summarising the overall findings of the 2017 survey, the GCA highlighted two 
related areas that had now overtaken delayed payment as the biggest UTP issue for 
suppliers, both with significant implications for food waste: 
1 Forecasting errors and retailers taking insufficient responsibility for forecasts af-
ter they had been set, resulting in last minute changes to orders. 
2 Promotional offers being run with one supplier resulting in significant changes to 
orders to another supplier, without that supplier being given reasonable notice. 
In relation to the first point the Code Adjudicator Christine Tacon commented: ”One 
supplier’s comments really stood out. It was that if the retailers only knew just how 
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much waste their forecasting was generating, they would surely do something about 
it.” 
Summary of the surveys 
These yearly surveys show broadly positive trends in rising awareness and compli-
ance, and growing trust from suppliers in the GCA. However, several bottlenecks 
remain. The first one is the continued exclusion of indirect suppliers from the GCA’s 
remit. The fact remains that 56% of the suppliers interviewed are still reporting is-
sues with retailers breaking the Code four years after the establishment of the GCA. 
During 2016/2017, the GCA did not receive any dispute referrals, no investigations 
were carried out and no new enforcement measures were used.  
4.2.3 Analysis of the policy and challenges 
Investment and impacts 
In 2011, an impact assessment of the establishment of the GCA carried out by BEIS 
estimated that the transition costs of setting up the new body would be EUR 0.22m 
(GBP 0.2m), and that the operational costs would be EUR 0.9m (GBP 0.8m) per 
annum (BEIS 2011, p. 2). 
Institutional Costs of the GCA  
The ongoing costs are funded by BEIS, who then recoups 100% of the costs via a 
retrospective levy on the 10 supermarkets which are regulated. The calculation of 
the levy takes consideration of whether a retailer had been found to have breached 
the code that year, and therefore caused additional work for the GCA. Unspent levy 
at the end of each financial year is returned to the regulated retailers in the propor-
tions in which it was contributed. The overall funding is constrained by government 
setting the level of levy. 
Cost to retailers 
The amount that the GCA costs the retailers varies depending on the investigations 
undertaken. For example, the GCA’s expenditure for 2016/17 was EUR 705,1264 
(GBP 622,024) which decreased from EUR 2,027,188 (GBP 1,785,741) in 2015/16 
as no investigation was opened. However, the levy was set at EUR 2,269,997 (GBP 
2,000,000) from the regulated retailers, which was an increase from 2015/16 of 
EUR 1,021,498 (GBP 900,000). This increase was to provide sufficient funding to 
resource any future investigation and is based on the experience of running an 
investigation. 
Staffing Levels  
The GCA office is run by around seven staff, several of which work part time, in-
cluding the adjudicator herself. If an investigation is launched or extra resources 
are required, additional staff are brought in.  
In addition to paying the levy, each retailer appoints its own Code Compliance Of-
ficer. These are the main point of interaction between the retailer and the GCA and 
are trained staff responsible for ensuring GSCOP compliance of their businesses. 
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Additional fines 
On the 6th April 2015, the GCA was granted fining powers to a maximum of 1% of 
the relevant retailer’s UK turnover. This provided a strong financial disincentive for 
retailers to breach the code beyond reputational damage if they were found to be 
in breach of the code. The fines are calculated according to a five-step approach 
which considers several factors: 
 the seriousness of the infringement; 
 turnover in the UK; 
 the duration of the infringement; 
 any aggravating factors, such as the existence of intentional and repeated 
breaches or failures to comply with recommendations; 
 any mitigating factors, such as cooperation with the investigation or time taken 
to remedy the breach; 
 desired deterrent effect; and 
 proportionality (Stefanelli 2014).  
Economic, social and environmental impacts in the UK 
As the GCA survey is currently the only way in which the impact of the GCA is 
measured, it is difficult to accurately assess the impact of the intervention. Moreo-
ver, the costs of UTPs in general are very difficult to quantify, as most instances 
are unreported (see evidence above from insurers) and can range from financial 
losses and lower margins to financial failure of businesses. Insurance claims would 
be the most tangible way of measuring costs incurred, but as produce insurer stated 
in an interview with Feedback (2017) ‘‘we are operating in a completely broken 
market’’. Food waste could potentially be used as a proxy measure, with economic 
value extrapolated from tonnage, but the current EU definition of food waste does 
not include farm level waste and is not measured in any systematic way.  
Wider social impacts have not been evaluated, but would primarily relate to lower 
supplier incomes particularly felt in the agricultural sector. 
The environmental impacts of food waste are well established, and systematically 
reducing food waste in the supply chain by tackling UTPs could be a very effective 
way of tackling food waste. However, as there is no systematic measurement of 
food waste within the supply chain, nor of the drivers and causes of waste, drawing 
conclusions as to the environmental impacts is not possible. Increased measure-
ment and transparency would be one way to achieve this goal and are much needed.  
Coherence and synergy with other national level policies and EU policies 
The development of a regulatory approach to UTPs through the establishment of the 
GCA in the UK is consistent with existing legislation that deals with restrictive busi-
ness practices and the abuse of market dominance under the Competition Act 1998. 
This Act harmonises EU competition policy across the single market (Article 85 and 
86 of the Treaty establishing the European Community) and, amongst other fea-
tures, confers powers to investigate individual businesses to determine whether they 
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have breached prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a 
dominant position. The UK policy response to UTPs, and possible future extension 
to indirect suppliers, therefore has a high level of coherence and synergy with ex-
isting UK and EU policies addressing issues of market competition and restrictive 
business practices.  
The development and strengthening of existing policies on UTPs has implications for 
other policy areas both at the national and at the EU levels. In the wider context of 
policies aimed directly at addressing food waste, there are synergies between UTP 
policy development and the effectiveness of supply chain VAs. A backdrop of poor 
trading practices operating along the supply chain, and particularly with respect to 
primary producers’ interaction with retailers, will reduce the effectiveness of VAs.  
These policies are therefore complementary to one another. 
Key possible unintended consequences of a more regulated approach towards UTPs 
and development of a common set of rules across the EU would be: 
 If enforcement is weaker in some MSs than others, this could result in a shift in 
production to more weakly-enforcing MSs. 
 There is a risk that more regulatory approach may “crowd out” less formal ap-
proaches to dealing with UTPs, reducing the good will that exists within supply 
chains that are currently less prone to UTPs (Fałkowski et al. 2017) 
Main challenges in designing and implementing the intervention 
There are several ongoing challenges to the GCA which limit its effectiveness: re-
sourcing, scope, lack of awareness of the GCA and the ongoing climate of fear 
within the industry.  
Figure 7. Proposed Vertical Extension to the GCA’s remit. 
 
Source: Groceries Code Action Network (2017), http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/media.ashx/strawman-
proposal-on-extending-the-gca.pdf [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
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Resourcing and staffing  
Although a higher levy could be imposed to provide a better-resourced GCA, this is 
currently only funding a small team and a part-time GCA. A higher levy would be 
justified to fund an extension to the remit of the GCA to cover indirect as well as 
direct suppliers. The GCA currently relies on evidence being brought to her before 
an investigation is launched, which places the burden of supplying evidence on sup-
pliers coming forwards, or findings from external research, which can be limited in 
scope as funding needs to be sought elsewhere. Direct suppliers from other countries 
have a lower awareness of the code and therefore don’t know their rights. Even if 
they were aware, there can be language barriers and practical issues which mean 
they are at a disadvantage in submitting evidence to the GCA, which currently does 
not have the resources to provide adequate outreach to overseas suppliers and 
may thus be missing out on pieces of evidence that may warrant investigation. 
Indirect suppliers 
The GCA only protects direct suppliers, meaning that indirect suppliers that may be 
the target of UTPs are currently not protected by the code. Therefore, there have 
been a wide range of stakeholders who have called for the code to be extended to 
protect indirect suppliers. Supporters of this measure include politicians such as 
Julian Sturdy MP (Sturdy 2017) and the GCA Action Network, whose members in-
clude Traidcraft and the NFU (Sustain 2017). Figure 7 outlines the proposed exten-
sion and who would be covered by the code. A consultation exercise on extending 
the code has been undertaken by BEIS (Department for Business, Energy and In-
dustrial Strategy 2016), to which the government has responded by deciding not 
to extend the remit of the GCA to indirect suppliers, largely on grounds of cost (HM 
Government 2018). Instead, relatively minor changes have been brought forward, 
including the extension of the code to smaller retailers and making written contracts 
in the dairy sector compulsory. The latter measure uses a discretionary power to 
make it obligatory for written contracts to be applied between milk producers and 
processors under the EU CMO Regulation (1308/2013). 
Factors of success and key learnings 
Legislative change in relation to UTPs may be more effective than VAs, depending 
on the starting point in an individual MS. In the UK, the legislative approach became 
effective once the capacity to impose additional fines had received political backing. 
 
4.3 Unfair trading practices in Italy 
4.3.1 The food supply chain and food waste in Italy  
In Italy, the retail sector presents a lower market concentration compared to 
Western European countries, despite being characterized by a fragmented supply. 
The share of shops employing one to nine persons (99.2% in 2010), as well as the 
share of self-employees (48.1%) are the highest in the EU, and the penetration of 
private labels (17%) the lowest. Therefore, the power of big chains is less an issue 
compared to EU countries like, e.g., the UK, France or Germany. Meanwhile, the con-
tribution of the retail sector to the GDP is close to the EU average (4.1%). However, 
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a relative consolidation has been taking place in the last 15 years: the number 
of shops employing one person has decreased and the share of food sales carried out 
by large retail distributors (GDO) reached 72% in 2010 (OECD 2013). 
Buyer power is further strengthened by two dynamics: the creation of super-alli-
ances among retail chains (in 2010 the top seven chains accounted for 78% of the 
GDO sales), and the high concentration at local level (the largest retailers may 
represent up to 60% of the GDO sales in a Province, with only two super-alliances 
accounting for 70-80% in some areas) (Ibid, p. 246). In Italy competition is price-
based, hence these non-structural forms of cooperation affect horizontal price com-
petition, generating price uniformity. This represents a challenge especially in times 
of economic crisis and when food is concerned, because imperfect competition dam-
ages primarily vulnerable consumers. 
On the other hand, the share of producers who join a producer organisation is small 
(less than 30% for fruits and vegetables); their bargaining power is, thus, limited. 
Some surveys found that the supply chain of fruits and vegetables has a very com-
plex structure, due to product differentiation, an atomistic and fragmented pro-
duction, and the presence of several agents (intermediators) at different stages. 
Thus, distributors must rely on intermediaries, which results in an increase in con-
sumer prices (compared to producer prices) by 70% to 300% (Ibid). According to 
Palladino (2017), primary producers are the most vulnerable actors of the sup-
ply chain, due to their failure to associate, and poor organisational and programming 
ability. Although the geographical (Province) location of the farm is not an issue, 
lack of organisation is more common in the South of Italy. 
Producer associations can help overcome fragmentation. In Italy, cooperatives 
account for 32% of the total agricultural production, and for 23% of the processing 
industry’s sales. However, among the top 50 agri-food firms, which represent 37% 
of agri-food production, only seven are cooperatives, accounting for 6%. In 2015, 
in Italy, there were 10,645 cooperatives: 72% of producers, 16% of manufacturers, 
and 11% of retailers. Most of them (61%) are in the South, but their incidence on 
the total production is much higher in the North, where the cooperation model is 
more advanced. Those associated with the main national organisations were 6,322, 
accounting for 83% of the value of the national production. On average, their eco-
nomic size was 7.4 million Euros and they were employing 19 people (compared to 
2.3 million and 6.6 employees in the average agri-food firm). Although only 46% of 
them were located in the North, these accounted for 82% of the value of production. 
Overall, 3,178 were micro-enterprises producing less than two million Euros, while 
133 produced over 40 million. In 2015, the average number of members of a coop-
erative was 163, but it varied between 1,141 of olive oil producers, and 36 of meat 
producers (Agri Rete Service 2016). Such numbers show that, although cooperation 
reduces fragmentation, in Italy this is still an issue, especially in the South. 
The European Court of Auditors (2016) recognised that trading practices and mar-
ket structures can generate food waste. This happens in two ways: either through 
a disproportion of bargaining power between two parties, or through unfair practices 
taking place in the context of imbalanced power relations. Given the structure of the 
Italian agri-food sector described above, both phenomena are likely to happen. It is 
estimated that food losses and waste in Italy account to 8.8 million tons every year 
(CIHEAM and FAO 2016). At EU level, food losses and waste account for about 20% 
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of the overall food production (Stenmarck et al. 2016). An expert interviewed esti-
mate that, in Italy, UTPs generate losses that account for between 5% and 10% of 
the primary production (Palladino 2017). 
4.3.2 Overview of the policy: from art. 9 of law 192/1998 to art. 62 of 
law 27/2012 
At the beginning of this century, UTPs were addressed by means of traditional com-
petition policy tools. However, the legislation has evolved since then. Indeed, dif-
ferently from the UK, Italy considers that, to prevent UTPs in the agri-food sector, 
additional regulations are needed beyond such tools. Italian policymakers adopted 
an approach mixing regulation and self-regulation among market agents (EC 2016). 
Until 2001, the norm used to address UTPs in the agri-food supply chain was art. 9 
of the law on industrial subcontracting (192/1998), that introduced a prohibition 
of abuse of economic dependence for the first time in Italy. This is one of the 
most relevant UTPs. At EU level, it is perceived as a lack of effective deterrents and 
engagement, mainly toward SMEs and farmers (EC 2017a). In Italy, economic de-
pendence is defined as an “excessive imbalance between the duties and obligations 
for the parties arising from the commercial relationship” (Renda et al. 2014, p. 51). 
Initially, only the parties of the subcontracting agreement could invoke the applica-
tion of art. 9, which was achieved by means of an arbitration of the local Chamber 
of Commerce (Camera di Commercio). However, most of the Italian jurisprudence 
(including that of the Court of Cassation, Corte di Cassazione) extends the applica-
tion of this norm beyond subcontracting, to include all cases of abuse of economic 
dependence in business-to-business contractual relationships. 
Law 57/2001 further extended the applicability of art. 9, to protect overall market 
competition, in line with the legislation of other EU Member States. To do so, this law 
distinguished between “abuse of dominance” and “abuse of economic dependence”. 
Competence over the former was attributed to the Italian National Competition 
Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM). The AGCM is 
an administrative independent authority mainly responsible for introducing antitrust 
norms, established by law 287/1990 (Competition and fair-trading act). The AGCM 
has been endowed with additional powers by subsequent laws. Such powers include 
the repression of unfair commercial practices and misleading or unlawful compar-
ative advertising, as well as the application of conflict of interest laws to the holders 
of government positions. Being an independent authority, the AGCM makes its de-
cisions based on its establishing act, without any possibility for the Government to 
interfere11. 
According to law 57/2001, the AGCM can address the cases of abuse of dominance 
that affect a relevant market, but cannot sanction the infringer. Instead, the cases 
of abuse of economic dependence, which indicates a violation of “the parties’ gen-
eral obligation to behave correctly and in good faith during the negotiation, conclu-
sion and execution of a contract” (foreseen in the Italian Civil Code) is competence 
of ordinary courts (Renda et al. 2014, p. 51). 
                                       
11 http://www.agcm.it/en/general-information/what-the-antitrust-authority-is.html [Accessed 
04.09.2017]. 
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Table 3. UTPs forbidden by art. 62 and potential impact on food waste. 
No. Description Food waste examples 
1 Lack of clarity in the contract offer NA (does not apply directly) 
2 Lack of written contract NA (does not apply directly) 
3 Abuse of economic dependence 
The price offered by the purchasers of a 
product could be so low that is cheaper for 
producers to waste it, rather than collect-
ing/processing and selling it.  
4 Liability disclaimers 
Unbalanced liability, combined with low eco-
nomic profits can generate complicate condi-
tions and, thus, food losses. 
5 Unilateral modification clauses 
Agricultural products can be left unharvested 
due to order cancellations. 
6 
Terms unreasonably imposing or 
shifting risks 
Agricultural production is subject to unpre-
dictable factors, such as weather conditions; 
therefore, terms should allow flexibility, and 
provide a reasonably price. If terms do not 
consider unpredictable factors, stopping the 
production or wasting it can be more conven-
ient than selling it. 
7 
Unfair use of confidential infor-
mation 
NA (does not apply directly) 
8 
Unfair use of confidential infor-
mation after the contract expiry 
NA (does not apply directly) 
9 Unfair breaking of negotiations Many products, like dairy, fruit and vegeta-
bles, etc., are highly perishable; unfair/un-
expected contract termination might cause 
them to be wasted, since there is a very 
short time to find another purchaser. 
10 Unfair contract termination 
11 Refusal to negotiate 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
A series of prohibitions specifically applicable to business-to-business transactions 
in the agricultural and food sector was introduced by art. 62 of law decree 1/2012 
(“Urgent regulations for fair competition, infrastructure development, and compet-
itiveness”), converted with amendments by law 27/2012. The stated goal of this 
norm, which entered into force on 24.10.2012, is to ensure a viable economic com-
petition in the agri-food sector, but it may contribute (indirectly) to prevent or reduce 
food losses. Art. 62 incorporates, by referring to them when defining “due practices”, 
the European Principles of Good Practices in the Food Supply Chain (Ibid). These 
include: the requirement of a written contract form, predictability, compliance, pro-
vision of information, confidentiality, responsibility for risk, and justifiable requests. 
Art. 62 states that all contracts should be concluded in written form, should indicate 
a duration, the characteristics and the prices of the products, the mode of delivery, 
and the terms of payment (OECD 2013). It prohibits contractual provisions that: 
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(a) directly or indirectly impose unduly onerous purchase, sale or 
other conditions, the performance of obligations not related to the 
subject matter of the contract, or retroactive conditions; (b) apply 
objectively different condit ions for the supply of equivalent goods; 
(c) make the conclusion and performance of contracts and the con-
tinuity and regularity of the commercial relationships subject to the 
supply, by contracting parties, of goods or services which by their 
nature and according to commercial customs, have no connection 
with one another; (d) engage in undue unilateral supply of goods 
or services not just i fied by the nature or content of the commercial 
relationships; and (e) engage in any other unfair business behav-
iour that proves to be such even taking into account the complex 
of commercial relat ionships characterising the supply conditions” 
(De Franceschi 2015, p. 500).  
After the entry into force of art. 62, the number of UTPs prohibited in Italy became 
very large. The Green Paper on UTPs in the business-to-business food and non-food 
supply chain (EC 2013) identifies seven typologies of UTPs. Besides “territorial sup-
ply constraints” eventually imposed by multi-national suppliers, these seven typol-
ogies were further detailed into 11 practices representing “the core of the problem” 
by Renda et al. (2014, p. 11), who performed a comparative analysis of the legisla-
tion of the EU MSs. Compared to other MSs, the Italian law covers the largest num-
ber of UTPs: all the 11 typologies are forbidden. Although the grouping could be dif-
ferent depending on the level of detail, this classification helps comparatively assess 
the Italian legislation. However, among the concerns of experts reported by Renda 
et al. (2014), these provisions are limited to the relationships between businesses 
and micro-enterprises (Ibid). Table 3 illustrates how each of the 11 UTPs prohibited 
by art. 62 may contribute to the generation of food waste, primarily in the production 
and manufacturing phases.  
The responsibility for overseeing the application of art. 62 is attributed again to the 
AGCM. This can impose administrative fines that, in most cases, range from 516 to 
3,000 Euros, proportional to the benefits obtained by the party which did not comply 
(De Franceschi, 2016, p. 500). The upper limit is raised to 500,000 Euros, but only 
for a specific violation, which does not represent an UTP based on the previous defi-
nition (i.e. when the buyer does not pay the goods received within 30 days for per-
ishable products and 60 days for other products)12. Furthermore, the lower limit is 
always kept at 516 or 500 Euros, so that the actual level of the fine is very arbitrary. 
To obtain a compensation for their damage, weaker parties need to take legal action. 
Legal action can also be initiated by consumer associations belonging to the National 
Council of Consumers and Users (Unione Nazionale Consumatori) or by business cat-
egories represented in the National Council of Economy and Labour (Consiglio Na-
                                       
12 The upper limit is raised to 20,000 Euros, and the value must be proportional to the good purchased/ 
sold, if the violation concerns the provisions of the first clause of art. 62 (i.e. the contract should be 
stipulated in written form, indicating duration, quantities, characteristics of the product, prices, ways 
of delivery, and means of payment). Instead, fines range from 500 to 500,000 Euros if the purchaser 
does not pay the goods within 30 days for perishable products and 60 days for other products; in this 
latter case, the fine must be based on the turnout of the purchaser, the frequency and the entity of 
the delay. However, the law contains no further specification on how to calculate the proportionality. 
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zionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro) or at national level. Indeed, the initial require-
ment according to which the provisions of art. 62 must be fulfilled “on sanction of 
voidness” of the contract was eliminated when the law decree was converted into 
law (Ibid). The AGCM can also start ex officio investigations, but confidential com-
plaints are not possible (Renda et al. 2014). Since the AGCM was already in place 
before the entry into force of art. 62, its approval neither implied any relevant in-
vestments, nor caused a direct increase in public expenditure. 
Despite several reasonable attempts to extend the applicability of art. 62, the AGCM 
issued a resolution specifying that its provisions apply only to the relations among 
enterprises of the agro-food supply chains (De Franceschi 2015). Still, a legal 
expert cited by Renda et al. (2014) argues that the provisions of this norm are im-
possible to satisfy, given the frequency with which the contracts between retailers 
and suppliers are negotiated. Moreover, the prevalent opinion among jurists is to 
rule out the mandatory character of art. 62, which says that the invalidity of a 
contract can be declared only by a judge (not by the AGCM). De Franceschi (2015) 
argues, instead, that the violation of a clause like the prohibition of the transfera-
bility of claims is likely to invalidate a contract, in line with the provisions of Directive 
2011/7/EU against late payments. Thus, the jurisprudence is still evolving. The find-
ings of a survey carried out by AGCM in 2013 suggest prioritising the interventions 
ex art. 62 based on two criteria: whether a competition restriction has a significant 
effect on the functioning of a market, and whether an unfair conduct is widespread 
(OECD 2013). Hence, protection of weaker market players is only a by-product of 
the promotion of a level-playing field (Ibid). 
Stakeholders’ attitude 
As Figure 8 shows, there are different links among stakeholders and an intervention 
in one can produce different implications on the others. The actors of the food sup-
ply chain mainly involved (either as victims or as wrongdoers) in UTPs are farmers, 
large retail distributors (GDO), small retail distributors and intermediaries, including 
the buyers who work for large retail chains. Some of them are members of broader 
organisations, like business associations, or join in producer, processor and retailer 
cooperatives. Consumers play an important role on the market with their demand. 
All of them interact with policymakers or experts, and especially with national en-
forcing authorities (the AGCM, and the Chamber of Commerce). 
The AGCM carries out periodic market analyses and surveys to identify compe-
tition issues in the agri-food sector. These surveys found that up to four intermediary 
operators intervene in the fruit and vegetable supply chain (OECD 2013). Cartels 
were identified among bakers, as well as among pasta manufacturers and their in-
dustry associations, that had caused an unjustified increase in prices in 2006-2009 
(Ibid). However, with two cases of market foreclosure by dominant actors, the multi-
product (retail) sector is the one with most abuses identified (Ibid). 
A 2003 survey focused on vertical relations between agro-food firms and large re-
tailers. Agricultural producers mentioned problems such as long negotiations (even 
two- or three-level, first with “super-alliances”, then with single retailers, with con-
sequent time consumption, which is problematic especially for small producers), re-
quests of delivering goods before formalising the agreement, unilateral changes in 
the contractual conditions, and especially trade spending (i.e. additional fees to be 
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paid for promotional services, which are rarely required by small producers, but may 
represent up to 40% of the value negotiated) (Ibid). A new survey from 2013 did 
not detect any conduct needing immediate intervention but highlighted many issues 
of vertical nature: e.g. 57% of the producers declared that they accept retroactive 
unilateral changes often or always due to fear of commercial retaliation (EC 2014). 
Figure 8. Relationship among stakeholders.  
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
According to the findings of a recent investigative report (Ciconte and Liberti 2017), 
small producers often avoid reporting cases of UTPs not to be “delisted” as suppliers 
of large retail chains. Hence, the impossibility to file confidential complaints 
according to art. 62 is likely to reduce the efficacy of this norm. Consistently, Pal-
ladino (2017) argued that the “fear” of being expelled from the market due to retal-
iation by stronger partners is the main reason why the victims of UTPs are unlikely 
to fill complaints based on art. 62.  
4.3.3 Analysis of the policy and challenges 
The approval of art. 62 is part of an attempt of Italy to comply with the EU legislation. 
This norm extended the provisions of Directive 2005/29/EC (which deals with UTPs 
in the business-to-consumer sale of goods and services) to the relationships between 
large businesses and small and medium-sized firms (Hilty et al. 2013). According to 
Palladino (2017), there are no contrasts between the Italian and the EU legislation, 
and that there are no EU norms interfering with the application of the former. 
The impact of art. 62 cannot be clearly assessed for two reasons. First, its approval 
is relatively recent (as of 2014, it had not been applied yet; OECD 2013). Second, 
its preventive nature biases the results of any evaluations. Palladino (2017) could 
mention no cases of application and considers that weaker stakeholders of the agri-
food chain expect no results from its application in the future. Indeed, there are no 
norms supporting weaker partners either in the phase of implementation of a con-
tract, or in the application of art. 62. Since all actors of the agri-food chain benefit 
from the payments of the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as from the national 
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tax system, he argued that a strategy to prevent UTPs could be to suspend all fiscal 
incentives in case of violation of art. 62 (Palladino 2017). However, this possibility 
is not foreseen in the norm. He also highlighted the need of a system of registration 
of the contracts with quantities and prices to avoid unjustified or unilateral changes 
(Ibid). Nevertheless, the establishment of a non-atomised offer by means of well-
functioning producer organisations is paramount for these provisions to be effective. 
Like in the UK, also in Italy there is a “fear factor” that prevents complaints against 
UTPs. Such factor was found to significantly reduce the propensity of weak partners 
to raise objections against the conduct of buyers all over the EU: 65% of the sup-
pliers keep a conciliatory attitude due to fear (De Franceschi 2015). The role of the 
“fear factor” has been recognised by the European Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development Phil Hogan (Marks 2017). Hogan expects a legislative proposal 
to set new rules on price transparency and increase the power of agricultural 
cooperatives in early 2018. He considers that even the reforms proposed by the 
Agricultural Markets Taskforce set up by the EC to improve farmers’ position are not 
enough. The incoming norms will affect also the Italian legislation in the next years. 
UTPs impact on food waste also at supranational level. At the EU level, they can be 
addressed by the EU Food Fraud Network. This institution was established with a 
view to allowing EU Member States to comply with arts. 36–40 of the 2004 Official 
Controls Regulation13 in matters where national authorities must deal with intentional 
violations of food chain laws having a cross-border impact. Although this institution 
can address UTPs, it must deal with very broad topics. Hence, the EC President Jean-
Claude Juncker considers that additional legislative measures, like those mentioned 
by Commissioner Hogan, must be taken (EC 2017b). Also in this case, like for AGCM 
with respect to art. 62 in Italy, a very broad legislation coupled with an overloaded 
supervision authority may result in an inefficient application of the legislation itself.  
 
4.4 Comparative analysis 
The approach adopted in the UK and in Italy to tackle UTPs in the food supply chain 
differ both in their evolution and in the regulatory outcome. This is due to the dif-
ferent socio-economic background, market structure, as well as drivers for adoption. 
4.4.1 Preliminary market conditions 
Despite a different market structure, the “victims” and the “wrongdoers” are the 
same in both countries, i.e. small producers and processors of perishable products, 
and large retail companies, respectively. Consequently, the “fear factor” is com-
mon to both countries, and “victims” may avoid pursuing legal claims to have their 
rights respected. Another issue is represented by awareness of these rights as, for 
example, in the UK the “wrongdoers” are based in the country, but the “victims” are 
often international and less aware of their rights. 
                                       
13 Regulation 882/2004 “On official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with 
feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules”. 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
38 
Compared to Italy, the UK presents stronger market concentration and farmers’ 
organisations (the NFU), as well as a stronger civil society that brought evidence of 
the impact of UTPs on producers and suppliers at home and internationally. The NFU 
carried out surveys on UTPs whose findings were used as an evidence that the vol-
untary approach was ineffective and, therefore, were a significant factor in the gov-
ernment’s decision to adopt a regulatory approach through legislation. In contrast, 
in Italy there was almost exclusively anecdotical evidence of the abuse of market 
power by large retail companies, provided by newspaper reportages. Furthermore, 
while in the UK the association of retailers (BRC) argues that “hard bargaining” could 
be beneficial for consumers, in Italy there are no strong organisations carrying out 
negotiations at national-level and the conflict between the two sides has not been 
brought to the forefront, hence finding long-lasting solutions is difficult. Finally, in 
the UK there was a more consolidated policy approach to address UTPs, based on 
a previous experience of VAs. Instead in Italy, despite the evidence of a large 
diffusion of UTPs, for a long period these have been addressed by means of an 
extensive interpretation of art. 9 of the law of subcontracting, and no specific reg-
ulatory framework was set before 2012.  
4.4.2 Different approaches to reach the same goal 
The pathway to establishing the GCA in the UK started from a bottom-up ap-
proach: a voluntary framework was set up, a survey carried out, and an investigat-
ing commission established before moving to a regulatory approach through legis-
lation. Instead, in Italy, the adoption of art. 62 seems to have been the result of a 
top-down process, where the country aimed at complying with EU criteria at least 
formally. 
A strong challenge to the fight against UTPs in Italy is identified in the lack of prior 
attempts to address UTPs by means of suasive instruments, so that the information 
available is also poor. In the UK, voluntary tools are usually preferred to regulation. 
However, in the case of the GCA these tools were turned into compulsory regulation 
once this approach received political backing due to the serious concerns identified 
by the 2008 investigation. In Italy, there were limited linkages between voluntary 
and regulatory approaches, and policymakers did not take advantage of civil society 
monitoring and/or VAs to improve the scope and the effectiveness of the regulation. 
The authorities responsible for addressing UTPs were also established in a different 
way and operate differently. In the UK, the GCA deals specifically with the grocery 
sector14, while in Italy the AGCM must deal with all antitrust issues, not only with 
those related to the food sector. Hence, the GCA can focus on UTPs without having 
too many disputes to solve. On the other hand, the GCA deals only with the relations 
between direct suppliers and retailers, so that upstream relations are not included 
in the definition of UTPs, while the Italian law includes all business-to-business 
relations in the food supply chain. Moreover, in the UK the GSCOP covers (direct) 
suppliers all over the world, while the Italian legislation does not say clearly whether 
the nationality of the supplier matters. However, there are no reason to think that 
foreign suppliers are not covered by art. 62, as long as the violation happens on the 
                                       
14 Also in the UK there is a Competition and Markets Authority like the AGCM in Italy, that performs a 
wider role than the GCA. 
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Italian territory (which may be a challenge in case of exchange of goods across coun-
tries). These are aspects to consider when setting up further legislations. 
In both the UK and Italy, direct appeal to the authority is limited. In the UK, indi-
vidual suppliers cannot file complaints, but the GCA can start independent investi-
gations. In Italy, the judgements of the AGCM do not invalidate a contract, but the 
victim has then to appeal to ordinary courts. 
The funding of the GCA is quite limited, and most of its staff are part-time. Due to 
the different nature of Italy’s AGCM, its resources and staff are much larger, however 
this body must deal with several issues. A valid comparison would be between the 
UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and Italy’s AGCM, as their roles and 
remit are the same. The GCA deals with only a subset of the CMA issues specific to 
grocery supply chains, which are set by the scope defined by its regulation. 
Investigations, penalties and monitoring 
In both countries, the number of investigations carried out is limited. In Italy, 
given the “fear factor” that limits the number of claims, there are no assessments, 
apart from the opinion of the expert provided in the previous paragraph (Palladino 
2017) and some newspaper investigations. Differently, in the UK, previous interven-
tions by the GCA caused trust between retailers and suppliers to increase, so 
that the cases of UTPs decreased. The fact that each retailer appoints its own Code 
Compliance Officer is another important mechanism through which trust is built 
and compliance with the code improved. 
There are also sizeable differences in the penalties. In Italy, the lower limit foreseen 
by the legislation for the fines (516 Euros), and the upper limit for most violations 
(3,000 Euros) are ridiculously low compared to the damage caused by most UTPs, so 
that they can hardly have any deterrent effect. Instead, in the UK the maximum level 
of fine that can theoretically be issued is set a 1% of a business’ turnover, so that 
the relative cost of violating the law is perceived as significant. Additionally, in the 
UK the regulatory approach became effective once the possibility of imposing fines 
received political backing. Furthermore, the investigations, assessment and ranking 
of how supermarkets are doing is important, as retailers are sensitive to the repu-
tational damage that the investigations can inflict, not just the financial penalties. 
In the UK, the GCA’s activities are funded by a general levy on large retailers as well 
as the recovery of costs from arbitrations undertaken by the GCA and fines which 
may have resulted; then, any unspent funds are returned to the regulated retailers, 
in proportion to their original levy contributions. Instead, in Italy AGCM is funded by 
general taxation. The UK strategy could theoretically cause the penalties to increase 
if many cases of UTPs are detected, thus generating collective blaming on “wrong-
doers”. However, a breach of the GCOP requires detailed collection of evidence that 
is resource- and time-consuming, and the GCA’s limited resources limit the number 
of investigations carried out yearly. Also, the proceeds of any successful investiga-
tions are not accumulated beyond covering costs. 
Finally, in neither country there is a systematic measurement of food waste that 
occurs as indirect consequence of UTPs, and that could be used as a proxy of them. 
Indeed, the current EU definition of food waste does not include farm-level losses. In 
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Italy, not even the impact of art. 62 on the diffusion of UTPs is subject to monitor-
ing. In the UK, annual surveys are carried out by the GCA, thus providing an active 
monitoring of the key supplier issues in relation to UTPs through time. In later years, 
a key finding has been the decline in cases of late payment. Furthermore, there is 
an ongoing consultation process in the UK to review the effectiveness of the GCA and 
decide whether its remit should be extended. It was recently decided not to do so in 
terms of indirect suppliers, while the provisions of the GSCOP have been extended 
to smaller retailers.  
4.4.3 Conclusions and recommendations 
The UK and Italian experiences allow to draw a number of recommendations for the 
countries wanting to introduce policy measures to tackle UTPs in the agri-food sec-
tor. First, like for other policies, a preliminary assessment of underlying market 
conditions in terms of concentration and power asymmetries at national and local 
level is needed. To explore the potential effects of the regulatory measures one wants 
to introduce and assess stakeholders’ availability to avoid abusing of market power, 
a voluntary approach could be preliminarily adopted, like in the UK before estab-
lishing the GSCOP. If this approach is successful, it can be consolidated without turn-
ing to regulatory measures. Otherwise, this period of “trial” can be used to identify 
best practices to insert in the regulation. 
The authority responsible for tackling UTPs should receive enough funding (includ-
ing by means of the fines imposed15) to carry out independent investigations and, at 
the same time, it should have the possibility to focus specifically on the agri-food 
sector. For example, in Italy a specialised section of the AGCM could be established. 
Furthermore, this authority should better be empowered of redressing unfair situa-
tions by setting the sizes of the fine and of the compensations without any need 
for the victim to claim to ordinary courts. The latter could intervene only in a fol-
lowing moment, in case the “wrongdoer” does not comply within the terms, without 
any need for the “victim” to claim. Obviously, the fines should be of an appropriate 
amount to discourage the adoption of UTPs by stronger parts. The UK’s decision to 
calculate them as a percentage of the wrongdoer’s turnover could become a good 
practice to extend to other countries. 
As for the definition of the practices forbidden, it should be as general as possi-
ble to avoid an unequal treatment of comparable situations and allow the authority 
to judge based on the principle of equity. For example, the UK should include 
indirect suppliers, and inform foreign ones of their rights every time that they 
register a contract with UK-based buyers. Instead, Italy – as well as the countries 
that have not set a regulatory framework yet – should adapt the general framework 
to the specific characteristics of their internal market structure: forbidding a large 
(and detailed) number of practices may result in the impossibility for the authority 
to prosecute them. Finally, preventing retaliation by the “wrongdoer” should be-
come a primary goal of any legislation; otherwise, the weaker parts in the negoti-
                                       
15 For example, in the UK, funding for annual operational costs is in the form of a levy, while fines are 
used to cover the costs of investigations when a retailer is at fault. This helps avoid a situation where, 
if retailers are not found to be at fault, there isn’t sufficient funding of the authority. 
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ations would not claim. Allowing confidential claims, as well as carrying out pe-
riodical independent market investigations to identify unfair conducts regard-
less of claims could be two effective strategies to overcome the “fear factor” and 
prevent the delisting of claimants. 
As for the consequences of UTPs in terms of food waste, neither country adopted 
a clear strategy to tackle them. Such consequences could be partially addressed by 
setting an organisational structure to distribute the surpluses resulting from order 
cancellation or from other UTPs at a lower price, coupled with campaigns to promote 
these products. Moreover, as an ancillary sanction, “wrongdoers” could be forced, 
to purchase the agri-food product object of the UTPs from the “victim” for a mini-
mum number of agricultural years. 
Finally, the monitoring of the effectiveness of the legislation (e.g. how many cases 
have been brought up, who was the “winner”, whether there has been any change in 
the conduct so far) seems to be very poor, and totally missing in the case of Italy. A 
State-funded independent third party, charged with investigating and controlling, is 
needed. In the partial absence of this, NGOs and journalists have filed that spot, 
but although the role played by them in the UK represents an interesting experience, 
this is not a viable long-term solution. Further research could include assessing the 
effectiveness of legal tools for regulating contractual agreements. This would al-
low to identify the weaknesses of the legislation and, thus, what is needed to make 
it more effective without increasing too much the monitoring costs and the costs 
for weaker parts to defend their rights. 
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5   Case study 2: Voluntary Agreements 
to fight food waste 
5.1 Voluntary Agreements: definition and context 
Food waste is an issue that is rooted in diverse sectors and policy areas, making it 
crucial to address through a strategic and integrated approach. Policy research 
through REFRESH has identified that food waste drivers are cross-cutting by nature 
(Burgos et al. 2017). This transversality implies that a wide number of actors with 
various profiles is involved.  
In this context, REFRESH researchers explored alternative policy measures to re-
duce food loss and waste such as Voluntary Agreements (VAS), also called vol-
untary alliances or frameworks for action (Osoro 2016). Within REFRESH, these 
three terms are used interchangeably. The success factors of VA were also investi-
gated to better understand how this alternative policy measure can enhance col-
laboration throughout the supply chain with the common ambition to reduce food 
waste.  
Voluntary Agreements are defined by the REFRESH policy brief “Voluntary Agree-
ments as a collaborative solution for food waste reduction” (Burgos et al., 2018) 
as: 
5.2 Voluntary Agreements in the UK 
5.2.1 The problem of food waste in the UK  
An overview of the UK’s food supply chain and the problem of food waste is pro-
vided in Section 4.2.1 The food supply chain and food waste in the UK. 
5.2.2 Overview of the policy: the Courtauld Commitments 
Definition of the Courtauld Commitment 
Voluntary Agreements are self-determined commitments or pacts with 
qualitative and quantitative objectives, developed by private entities and/or 
other stakeholders in consultation with their signatories. They are used as al-
ternative courses of action to traditional legislation, can be piloted by govern-
ment officials, businesses or other actors, and can be used in addition to, or 
independently from existing legislation. 
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Within the UK’s context of food waste, one of the most well-known VAs is the Cour-
tauld Commitment (CC), which started in 2005 and continues to make a positive 
impact on food waste issues today16. 
This VA brings together major stakeholders in the UK grocery sector to set, monitor, 
and achieve resource efficiency and waste reduction targets while incentivising 
knowledge sharing of best practices.  
Since the launch of the CC, it has undergone four phases: 
 CC 1 (2005-2009);  
 CC 2 (2010-2012);  
 CC 3 (2013-2015); 
 Courtauld 2025 (2016-2025). 
The CC is funded by all of the UK Devolved Administrations (DAs) (Scottish, Welsh 
and Northern Ireland governments) and delivered by the Waste & Resources Action 
Programme (WRAP). WRAP is a UK charity focused on resource efficiency, co-
funded by Defra and the DAs17. 
WRAP’s role in the implementation of this VA has been vast throughout its four 
phases. WRAP works in partnership with leading retailers, brand owners, manufac-
turers and suppliers who sign up and support the delivery of the targets. WRAP 
regularly convenes working groups, forums, workshops and meetings to enable 
signatories to share best practices and discuss how to make progress towards the 
targets. Furthermore, WRAP has access to, and analyses confidential company data 
communicated by the signatories and aggregates it to assess the total impact of 
the actions (WRAP 2013).  
Step by step description of the Voluntary Agreement 
The following sub-sections detail each of the four phases of the CC. 
Courtauld Commitment 1 (2005 – 2009) 
Objectives and stakeholders 
In the early 2000s, the environmental administrations of England, Northern Ire-
land, Scotland and Wales funded WRAP to initiate a VA based on the example of 
the Packaging Covenant in the Netherlands (OECD 2000). WRAP cooperated with 
DEFRA, the British Retail Consortium and the Food and Drink Federation to organise 
a Ministerial Summit at the Courtauld Institute in March 2005 attended by the ma-
jority of leading grocery retailers in the UK (WRAP 2013c).  
                                       
16 https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/programmes/government/toolkit-for-policym 
akers/case-studies/courtauld-commitment [Accessed 14.12.2017]; http://www.wrap.org.uk/cate-
gory/initiatives/courtauld-commitment [Accessed 14.12.2017]. 
17 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255512/wrap-
funding-review-summary-responses-131104.pdf [Accessed 14.12.2017]. 
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At the 2005 Summit, stakeholders signed the first CC, aimed at finding new solu-
tions and technologies to diminish the food and primary packaging ending up as 
household waste. The three original targets were: 
 to design out packaging waste growth; 
 to reduce packaging waste in absolute terms; and 
 to reduce food waste at the household sector by 155,000 tonnes compared to 
the 2008 baseline (WRAP 2013c). 
It is therefore important to note that the original objectives of the CC were not 
exclusively aimed at food waste reduction, but also at a smarter design of pack-
aging waste reduction.  
For its first phase, the CC counted 42 signatories including 10 retailers and 32 
brands, manufacturers and suppliers. The retailers represented 92% of the UK’s 
grocery supermarkets (WRAP 2010a).  
Policies implemented 
Grocery retailers targeted consumers through information campaigns on food and 
packaging wastes and rethought practices such as labelling, pack sizes and promo-
tions to facilitate consumer action and increase its impact. There are many exam-
ples of signatory activity: 
 Sainsbury’s “Love Your Leftovers”;  
 Morrisons’ “Great Taste Less Waste”; 
 Optimised food product labelling (e.g. Warburtons removed “display until” dates 
used by retail staff to rotate products, leaving more prominent “best before” 
date) 
 Pack sizes better suited to today’s household sizes (e.g. Kingsmills “Little Big 
Loaf”); 
 Purchase-flexible promotions on food products to the consumer (e.g. Tesco’s 
“Buy One Get One Free Later”).  
Collectively, signatories spent millions of pounds supporting the delivery of House-
hold Food Waste prevention programmes (WRAP 2010b). In addition, over the pe-
riod of the first CC WRAP managed an integrated consumer facing Love Food Hate 
Waste (LFHW) programme across the UK, helping those who wanted to reduce their 
food waste and save money. More than 300 local authorities have also run Love 
Food Hate Waste initiatives that help local people, including road shows, cookery 
demonstrations and recipe competitions, working with community groups, housing 
associations, and businesses. Community groups and individuals have also taken 
action (WRAP 2010b).  
Impacts of the policies implemented 
While the CC1’s target of reducing food waste by 155,000 tons was reached, the 
packing waste reduction objective was missed by a narrow margin. In other words, 
while the amount of packaging waste was not reduced, the absolute amount of 
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packaging waste actually remained stable (at approximately 2.9 million tonnes be-
tween 2006 and 2009. However, as there was a 6.4% increase in grocery sales 
volumes, this means the average packaging weight per product did actually reduce 
(WRAP 2013c). 
Considering the CC1’s impact, it was estimated by WRAP that without the CC1, the 
food and packaging waste would have increased by 670,000 tonnes of food waste 
and 520,000 tonnes of packaging waste (WRAP 2013b). Hence, these levels of waste 
were avoided across the UK, which also correspond to a monetary value of GBP 1.8 
billion (EUR 2.0 billon), and emissions savings of 3.3 million tonnes of CO2-eq. 
In addition to the qualitative and measurable results of cost, waste and CO2-eq. 
emissions saving from the CC1, signatory companies furthermore experienced the 
following within their organisations: (WRAP 2013a):  
 Enabled to meet consumer demand for waste reduction; 
 Improved practice and innovation; 
 Improved resource efficiency of products and their packaging; 
 Created a support network and vehicle for change; 
 Developed corporate environmental performance;  
 Improved competitiveness and resilience of the signatories. 
During CC1, the UK’s leading grocery retailers, and direct competitors (Tesco, 
Sainsbury’s, Asda, Morrison’s, etc.) collaborated to reduce food and packaging 
waste. CC1 also demonstrated that consumers were receptive to awareness mes-
sages on food waste that came from the actor from which the consumer purchased 
their food products. CC1 therefore set a precedent for future cooperation and for 
consumer action (WRAP 2013c).  
Courtauld Commitment 2 (2010 – 2012) 
Objectives and stakeholders 
In its second phase, the CC broadened its focus from the retail sector to the entire 
food supply chain and incorporated references to the carbon impact of food pack-
aging. The targets set in 2010 for the year 2012 were:  
 To reduce the carbon impact of grocery packaging by 10% (reduce the weight, 
increase recycling rates and increase recycled content of grocery packaging); 
 To cut supply chain and packaging waste by 5%; 
 To reduce household food and drink waste by 4%. 
For its second phase, the CC counted 53 signatories including 10 retailers and 43 
brands from manufacturers and suppliers. WRAP also had the support of business 
associations, standards agencies and other organisations working throughout the 
food supply chain (WRAP 2013d). 
An important point to note is that signatories only reported waste when they had 
ownership of the products, therefore the targets applied to the brands belonging to 
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the signatory. This aimed at avoiding double-counting in cases where the manu-
facturer and the retailer of a same product were both signatories (WRAP 2013e). 
Policies implemented  
Several CC1 initiatives (labelling, promotions, campaigns, etc.) continued during 
CC2. Furthermore, CC2 attempted to achieve its objectives both by valorising waste 
streams and through actions on food waste drivers (overproduction, product dam-
age, etc.). Case studies of actions initiated by CC2 signatories are available on 
WRAP’s website (WRAP 2012), including: 
 Lightweight packaging, recycled packaging content, designed packaging with 
recyclability in mind and changed product formats to better accommodate con-
sumer needs (e.g. refill packs). 
 Focused waste prevention strategies by retailers and manufacturers based on 
research, tools and expertise offered by WRAP (WRAP 2013). 
Impacts of the policies implemented 
Two of CC2’s objectives were reached while the third was missed by a narrow mar-
gin: 
 The carbon impact of grocery packaging decreased by 10%, hitting the reduc-
tion target. 
 Traditional grocery product and packaging waste in the grocery supply chain 
was reduced by 7.4% (217,000 tonnes per year) exceeding the 5% target  
 The total household food waste was reduced by 3.7% (270,000 tonnes per year) 
against a target of 4% (WRAP 2013). 
In total, 1.7 million tonnes of waste were avoided during this phase (WRAP 2017), 
corresponding to a monetary value of GBP 3.1 billion (EUR 3.5 billion), and emis-
sions savings of 4.8 million tonnes CO2-eq. (WRAP 2013). 
In addition to the qualitative and measurable results of cost, waste and CO2-eq. 
emissions saving from the CC2, like the CC1, signatory companies experienced 
additional benefits within their organisations: 
 
 Improvement of the resource efficiency of products and packaging; 
 Proactivity before facing a carbon-constrained future; 
 Improvement of their public image among the consumers; 
 Reasons and motivation to innovate (WRAP 2013). 
Courtauld Commitment 3 (2013 – 2015)  
Objectives and stakeholders 
For the third phase of the CC, three new targets were set with quantitative objec-
tives evaluated on 2012 baselines: 
 Reduce household food and drink waste by 5%; 
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 Cut traditional grocery ingredient, product and packaging waste in the grocery 
supply chain by 3%; 
 Improve packaging design throughout the supply chain and prevent any in-
crease in the carbon impact of packaging (WRAP 2016e). 
The packaging optimisation measures during CC3 were a continuation of the 
measures implemented during CC2 with an added focus on the eco-design of pack-
aging in order to target the issue of (unintentionally) induced product waste due to 
poor packaging design.  
CC3 involved 53 signatories including 10 retailers, i.e. the same number as during 
CC2 with some actors leaving and others joining (WRAP 2014). 
Policies implemented 
CC3 continued and built on initiatives started during the previous two phases.  
WRAP continued the “Love Food Hate Waste” campaign and started “Your Work-
place Without Waste”, an engagement programme to raise awareness among sig-
natories’ staff and engage them into identifying waste sources in order to take 
action within their company to reduce them (WRAP 2015). WRAP also continued its 
workshops and other information-sharing initiatives to assist companies in tackling 
common challenges. 
The following are case studies of actions initiated by CC3 signatories, available 
within WRAP’s final report on the CC3 (WRAP 2015): 
 Tesco reduced in-store bakery waste;  
 Morrisons found substantial potential savings in meat pie production; 
 Greencore and Sainsbury’s identified waste prevention solutions across their 
sandwich supply chain; 
 The beer and soft drinks sectors developed a checklist of operational actions to 
reduce waste in drinks manufacture (WRAP 2015). 
On top of that, WRAP conducted studies such as the “Quantification of food surplus, 
waste and related materials in the grocery supply chain” report, which gave com-
panies information about the potential for waste reduction (WRAP 2015). Training 
was offered to the public to raise awareness and provide good practices. Food busi-
nesses helped involve consumers by improving date labelling and providing storage 
advice to limit household waste. 
Impacts of the policies implemented 
Only the second and third of CC3’s objectives were achieved (WRAP 2015): 
 Household food and drink waste did not reduce by 5%, although it remained at 
stable levels; 
 Ingredient, product and packaging waste in the grocery supply chain was re-
duced by 3%, hitting the target; 
 CO2 emissions related to food packaging decreased by 7% (WRAP 2015). 
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In total, an estimated 1.1 million tonnes of waste were avoided during CC3, corre-
sponding to a monetary value of GBP 1.6 billion (EUR 1.8 billion), and emissions 
savings of 2.9 million tonnes of CO2–eq. (WRAP 2016b). 
According to WRAP, the impacts of CC3 went further than food waste reduction 
numbers and included the following considerations (WRAP 2015):  
 “Winning hearts and minds”: the CC raised awareness about food and packaging 
waste among companies and employees through action such as Your Workplace 
Without Waste (WRAP 2015). 
 “Working together in partnership”: diverse actors worked as a whole through 
workshops and experience sharing to address the main waste challenges. 
 “Pioneering change”: Signatory companies took the lead in the fight against 
food and packaging waste. This gave them visibility in the sector and fostered 
their innovation spirit.  
 “Operational improvements”: the changes implemented during CC3 resulted in 
substantial benefits for the signatories including the financial savings and the 
public reputation. 
5.2.3 Analysis of the policy and challenges 
The CC has provided positive change towards the reduction of food waste product 
packaging for a dozen years. Although political priorities have shifted from 2005, 
according to Dr Liz Goodwin, the former CEO of WRAP, also identifies the CC as a 
VA that provided continuity and a consistent objective “to reduce waste and save 
people, businesses and local authorities’ money” (Goodwin 2016).  
Although the CC’s fundamental focus remains to be on food and packaging waste 
reduction, the Courtauld 2025 shows how VAs can continue to push the envelope 
for change by introducing new focus areas within its scope such as water use re-
duction throughout the supply chain and waste generation at the farm level and 
the hospitality sector. 
Dr Liz Goodwin is optimistic about the new commitment as “the results have been 
satisfying with the three previous phases, so the next decade conveys a great hope” 
(Goodwin 2016). 
Factors of success 
A favourable national policy framework 
In 2005, food waste in the UK amounted to 30-40% of production, ranking the coun-
try as one of the worst in the world in terms of proportion of food wasted. Further-
more, a large share of this food was landfilled even if around 25% of it could be used 
as animal feed, which is not in line with the EU requirements (Vidal 2005). Indeed, 
the UK was a signatory to the Landfill Directive of 26 April 1999 (Directive 1999/31/ 
EC), which set a target of 50% reduction of biodegradable municipal waste between 
1995 and 2009. At that time, the preferred policy instrument of the UK government 
was legislation. At the launch of CC1, Elliot Morley, the Minister of State for the 
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Environment and Agri-Environment in DEFRA stated that the government was will-
ing to explore VAs but reserved the right to take harder measures if the VAs did 
not bring concrete results quickly. This “legislation threat” may have formed part 
of the motivation for the private sector to sign the CC (Mahon 2017).  
Phase 1 of the CC was a success and so was the Halving Waste to Landfill commit-
ment, another VA developed by WRAP within the same period. This sent positive 
signals to UK companies and the government regarding both the concept of VAs 
and the ability of WRAP to lead such projects and therefore established solid foun-
dations for the emergence of subsequent VAs (WRAP 2009).  
From CC2 onwards, the threat of government legislation faded. At the end of CC1 
in 2010, a coalition government of conservatives, supported by liberal democrats, 
was elected, prioritising issues directly related to the 2008 financial crisis, and in 
particular significant budgetary reductions across the UK public sector and a reduc-
tion in the volume of new legislation, over environmental issues, such as food 
waste. Therefore, from CC2 onwards, the government softened its approach, sup-
porting an entirely voluntary route to achieving the CC2 targets (Mahon 2017). 
Given the success of CC1, the absence of a legislation threat did not affect the 
subsequent CCs. 
Regarding the EU level, a link can be made between UK’s action against waste, and 
the revision of the EU waste management strategy in the early 2000s. The CC took 
into account this revised waste management strategy within its scope and further-
more capitalised on the increasing interests towards more sustainable waste sys-
tems to attract signatories. 
Today, the UK’s actions towards food waste reduction thanks to the CC is further-
more seen as contributing to the global food waste target set by Sustainable De-
velopment Goal (SDG) 12.3, adopted by the United Nations in September 2015 
(Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2015) . In other words, the UK’s objective to reduce 
food and drink waste by 20% by 2025 on the (including production, distribution, 
retail, hospitality and food services and households) is in line with the SDG 12.3 
goal to cut food waste in half by 2030. 
Despite these examples of the UK’s favourable context for food waste, the impact 
of Brexit on the UK national policy framework, and therefore on food waste issues 
are still unclear. As stated in the 2013 DEFRA review of WRAP, funding allocation 
from DEFRA to WRAP is reliant in part on ministerial priorities. This therefore means 
that depending on the effect of the Brexit on national priorities, funding for food 
waste research could potentially be impacted.  
A forum for exchange facilitated by an independent convener 
Each phase of the CC has placed dialogue as a central element of the agreement 
in order to facilitate exchange amongst actors along the supply chain. WRAP’s role 
as the independent convener of the agreements who facilitates this exchange and 
builds a network of trust amongst the signatories is seen as crucial by all partners 
(Goodwin). As mentioned before, the signatories of the CC agree to report annually 
their progress. WRAP collects companies’ food waste data, sums them for all sig-
natories (a process which is audited) ensuring thus confidentiality of individual 
players. All private actors are thus able to put aside competition and commercial 
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interest and collectively develop a clear strategic framework and targets. This al-
lows the food sector to collectively send clear signals to both suppliers and con-
sumers concerning its priorities and objectives, thus facilitating and encouraging 
waste reduction across the supply chain (Mahon 2017).  
In addition to WRAP’s confidentiality assurance for company data, all participants 
furthermore benefit from WRAP’s expertise in measuring and aggregating data in 
a centralised manner, free of charge. Within their two data collection models, WRAP 
is able to determine how much of the data results are directly influenced by the 
company’s application of the CC (Salo 2016). Through this independent monitoring, 
WRAP is held accountable for the accuracy of its work, which adds to its credibility.  
Signatories also appreciate WRAP’s food waste expertise and knowledge of require-
ments set by similar agreements in other countries internationally or through the 
UN, the FAO, or the EU. Members of WRAP are also active members of international 
organisations working to reduce food waste and help businesses integrate these 
requirements into their existing production processes, enhancing synergies with 
different food waste reduction agreements on the EU and global level. 
Recruitment of key players from the grocery industry 
Throughout its four phases, the CC managed to gather around the table key players 
of the food and drink sector. Courtauld 2025 includes food & drink businesses rep-
resenting 95% of the 2016 UK food retail market – as well as many leading brands, 
manufacturers and hospitality & food service companies.  
Aside from the advantage of the wide representation of actors across the supply 
chain within the CC, another factor that contributed to the success of the CC is the 
sign up at Board level (Mahon 2017). Having company, Board commitment involved 
in the CC has proven to be essential, as these individuals have the power to drive 
change within their company.  
The CC also shows that having a strong evidence-based business case to attract 
these CEOs in signing the agreement is critical in the recruitment process. The 
vision promoted by WRAP centres on how to prevent food waste, rather than on 
how to manage/dispose of it once it is already produced and wasted. The challenge 
is, therefore, to realise savings in another step of the chain in order to outweigh 
the potential valorisation of avoided waste.  
Moreover, it is worth underlining that the UK governments do not take direct ac-
tions to recruit participants (Salo 2016). Neither WRAP nor the UK government 
provides any direct financial incentives to signatories for their participation (Salo 
2016). The fact that major businesses of the sector join voluntarily is a sign of a 
strong motivation and sends positive signals to other potential signatories and to 
the public opinion. The impacts in terms of image and public opinion are significant. 
They also put forward the signatories’ involvement in their own communication 
campaigns (e.g. Dairy Crest, Agrimetric or Dawn meats websites).  
Common objectives and measurable progress 
Another factor that contributes to the success of the CC is that signatories collec-
tively set ambitious yet achievable and quantifiable targets with clear deadlines 
(Bryden et al. 2013). Table 4 provides an overview of the CC’s scope and primary 
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objectives across its four phases. Targets were generally met in each phase, and in 
the few cases in which they were missed, it was only by a small margin, demon-
strating signatories set ambitious, yet realistic targets.  
It is notable to mention that the definition of each new set of targets within each 
phase of the CC considered the outcomes of the previously conducted work. This 
consideration for the scope of each CC and its results were used in order to build 
on findings of the previous CC in order to fine-tune the next set of targets according 
to the current political and environmental context. For example, upon the conclu-
sion from CC1 that food waste reduction had continued potential, this focus and its 
relevant target was ensured in each consecutive phase of the CC (Mahon 2017).  
Existing limitations 
Absence of sanctions for non-compliance and absence of legislation 
In the current configuration of the CC, WRAP does not have any compliance power 
over signatories. WRAP writes to signatories who have not implemented real change 
in order to motivate them to take action, but is unable to sanction them in case of 
pursued non-compliance. Some signatories have expressed the desire to have 
stricter compliance requirements in the commitment. If the requirements were 
stricter, non-compliant companies would be sanctioned or removed from the CC so 
that they at least lose the advantages of participation (Salo 2016). 
In addition, the CC is currently a self-standing VA rather than a complement to 
regulation. Though legislation is by no means a guarantee of success, Scotland has 
a strict regulations on food waste, including a 70% recycling target and 33% food 
waste reduction for 2025 in Scotland (Scotl et al. 2016a). In Scotland, VAs are used 
as a tool to meet legislative targets. The UK government could, for example, set 
binding targets to ensure that all the actors are committed to the same objectives 
and have real motivation.  
The lack of legislation or sanction may result in little efforts to achieve the targets 
and may undermine the credibility of the commitment (Bryden et al. 2013). The 
dilemma is to choose between:  
 a wide involvement of a large number of actors giving visibility and momentum 
to the agreement; or  
 a deeper involvement of fewer signatories with more relevant and effective ac-
tions which might give better results. 
Lack of transparency in the monitoring process 
While monitoring is done within the framework of the agreement, only aggregated 
data is made available to the public, making it impossible to assess the amount of 
waste for each single signatory. This was repeatedly underlined by Feedback (Feed-
back 2006), which regrets the lack of transparency of this system. Individual par-
ticipants’ contribution to the VA remains hidden in the aggregated data so compa-
nies that have not implemented any significant changes will reap the same public 
image and expertise benefits from the VA as companies that have invested in food 
waste reduction. Moreover, as noted during a roundtable lead by the Food Ethics 
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Council in 2012, honesty and openness in challenges and difficulties can help de-
veloping working tools. Experience sharing should be about both successes and 
failures to be complete and fully efficient (Food Ethics Council 2012). 
According to some stakeholders, one way to address this obstacle would be to make 
individual reporting mandatory for all signatories. This way, no actor would consider 
it a disadvantage to report this information. WRAP could have an important role in 
this, by collaborating with the companies to make the reporting as efficient as pos-
sible. Collecting data is a complex issue when it comes to waste, and proper support 
could make final data more reliable. However, the risk of making individual report-
ing mandatory is that fewer companies would sign up to the voluntary agreement, 
making it less effective. 
 
Lack of incentives for other actors to join the CC 
The lack of incentives for specific types of actors can be seen as a limitation as it 
reduces the scope of the agreement. Indeed, while retailers are easily convinced 
to join the agreement because of brand motivations, it is more difficult for manu-
facturers whose sector is not directly affected by public opinion (House of Commons 
2017).  
Table 4. Objectives and impacts evolution through the CC. 
Phase 
CC1 
(2005 – 2010) 
CC2 
(2010 – 2012) 
CC3 
(2013 – 2015) 
CC 2025 
(2016 – 2025) 




hold food waste 
by 155,000 t in 
2010 compared 
to 2008 √+ 
Stop packaging 




aging waste √ 
(in intensity) 
4% reduction in 
Households 
food and drink 
waste X  
10% reduction 









5% reduction in 
household food 
and drink waste 
X 
3% reduction of 




crease in the 
carbon impact of 
packaging √+ 
20% reduction 
in food and 
drink waste in 
the UK 
20% reduction 
in the GHG in-
tensity of food 
and drink in the 
UK 
Reduce the im-
pact of water 
use throughout 
the whole sup-
ply chain  
Savings 
1.2 Mt waste 
GBP 1.8 billion  
3.3 Mt CO2-eq. 
(consolidated) 
1.7 Mt waste 
GBP 3.1 billion 
4.8 Mt CO2-eq. 
(consolidated) 
1.1 Mt waste 
GBP 1.6 billion 
2.9 Mt CO2-eq. 
(estimates) 
In progress 
Source: WRAP site: www.wrap.org.uk/category/initiatives/courtauld-commitment. Legend: X target 
missed √ target achieved √+ target exceeded. 
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The life cycle approach outlined within the CC2025 can be seen as an improvement, 
as it makes manufacturers realise the financial benefits achievable through waste 
reduction, as well as the other benefits inherent to the agreement. However, this 
fails to engage the sector in a greener and sustainable vision of its activity (House 
of Commons 2017).  
Challenges 
Courtauld 2025 (2016 – 2025) 
The fourth and current CC, Courtauld 2025, broadened its scope by working on the 
entire life cycle of products to reduce food waste. It involves 130 signatories (WRAP 
2016d) making up 93% of the 2016 UK market share in the food and drink sector 
(WRAP 2016c). 
This phase of the CC aims to lower the (environmental) impact and increase the 
efficiency of manufacturing, increase value of purchased food and drink, and opti-
mise food waste management (WRAP 2016a). The following three concrete targets 
accompany these focuses:  
 Reduce the food and drink waste across the supply chain (production, distribu-
tion, retail, hospitality and food services and households) by 20%; 
 Reduce the GHG intensity of food and drink consumption by 20% (WRAP 
2016a); 
 Reduce the impact of water use in the supply chain (specific target and metric 
foreseen to be developed in the coming year) (WRAP 2016a). 
This 9-year long commitment was designed by WRAP to enable participants to fit 
changes into existing business plans and focus on actions that may not lead to 
immediate results but have significant positive long-term consequences.  
Progress under Courtauld 2025 will be reviewed every three years by WRAP. Sig-
natories will work with WRAP to develop a roadmap towards the 2025 targets (Ma-
hon 2017). 
The scope of the CC changed according to the relevance of the particular phase: 
whereas CC1 was retail-focused, CC2 and CC3 focused on correcting flaws in the 
supply chain causing food and packaging waste on the food manufacturers and 
retailer levels. The new phase of the CC from 2016 to 2025 has a broadened scope, 
such as the introduction of the consideration of water use reduction throughout the 
supply chain). Furthermore, extending to almost 10 years, this new phase has the 
longest implementation period out of all of the CC, highlighting its long-term vision. 
Table 4 above illustrates the evolution of the different phases of the VA in terms of 
objectives and impacts. 
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5.3 Voluntary Agreements in the Netherlands 
5.3.1 The problem of food waste in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, a coalition of The Sustainable Food Alliance and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs developed the Sustainable Food Agenda 2013–2016. Reducing 
food losses and waste and optimizing waste streams are priority areas, with the 
ambition to also contribute to the objective of reducing food waste by 20% by 2015 
(with reference 2009). Though progress has been made in awareness and increased 
levels of actions, this is not reflected in a reduction of food waste figures yet. The 
issue of food waste reduction has been of high priority within businesses for many 
years. A series of public private initiatives and projects has been initiated.  
In the monitoring methodology in the Netherlands, a distinction is made between 
unavoidable, potentially avoidable and avoidable food waste flows. Only the poten-
tially avoidable and avoidable fractions are considered as food waste. The amount 
of food waste in 2015 in the Netherlands, based on this definition, and using avail-
able public and statistical sources, amounts to between 1.8 and 2.6 million tonnes. 
Per capita food waste levels are between a minimum of 105 kg and a maximum of 
152 kg (Soethoudt 2016). Government reports and current news demonstrate that 
the total amount of food wasted in the Netherlands is stagnating (REFRESH 
2017; Soethoudt 2016). 
There is a strong link between the level of the supply chain at which food is wasted 
and the final destination of the food wasted. In 2013, consumers were responsible 
for 0.8 million tonnes of wasted food (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2014), two thirds 
of which were incinerated. On the other hand, the waste occurred at food pro-
cessing level (about a fifth of the total) was used almost exclusively as animal feed 
(Soethoudt 2013).  
The Netherlands is at the forefront of efforts to measure and report on food loss 
and waste (Champions 12.3 2017). These efforts centre around academic and re-
search institutions supported by the government, such as Wageningen University 
& Research (WUR), that is involved in several national and European programs to 
reduce food waste. In addition, the Netherlands is currently a pilot country in the 
REFRESH program, implementing VA approaches to reduce food waste (REFRESH 
2017). 
Actors in the food supply chain have signed VAs in collaboration with the govern-
ment to implement food waste prevention, recycling and reuse policies. In January 
2017, efforts to connect initiatives against food waste culminated in the creation of 
the Taskforce for Circular Economy in Food (TCEF). This coalition of food compa-
nies, public and social enterprises aims at creating a unified framework for agree-
ments between companies and the government to reduce food waste. In the second 
half of 2017, the TCEF has proposed the Netherlands’ first national strategy and 
roadmap to jointly transition to a circular economy in food (Circulaire Econ-
omie 2017b). The TCEF operates as part of the program “The Netherlands Circular 
in 2050” (Circulaire Economie 2017b).  
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5.3.2 Overview of the policy: from the Sustainable Food Platform to the 
Taskforce for Circular Economy in Food 
The Sustainable Food Platform 
The question of sustainable food policy has been on the Dutch agenda since the early 
2000s. In 2008, the “Policy document on sustainable food” (Rijksoverheid 2008) set 
the basis of the Dutch policy on food waste, and was part of the overall government 
efforts towards sustainable development. The goal was to place the Netherlands in 
the frontline of sustainable food systems, including food waste reduction but also 
more efficient use of water, and less use of raw materials along with less CO2 emis-
sions, etc.  
The document also established the Sustainable Food Platform (SFP), which aimed 
to increase the range of market-oriented sustainable products by elaborating plans 
to improve production chains. The document clearly stated that parties do not enter 
a VA with an obligation, but with the moral duty to achieve concrete results. The 
plan also included the aim to reduce food waste by at least 20% between 
2009 and 2015 (Verburg 2008). To achieve this target, platform members shared 
information on existing processes and research to reduce food waste, while the 
government provided incentives and created the working conditions for real 
change.  
In general, since VAs in the Netherlands are still under development, some of their 
elements (e.g. incentives for compliance, or sanctions for non-compliance) have not 
been defined yet. These aspects are expected to be finalised by the middle of 2018. 
The Sustainable Food Alliance: a shift in the Dutch food waste policy 
The Sustainable Food Alliance (Alliantie Verduurzaming Voedsel) is a collaboration 
of the Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture (LTO Nederland), the Fed-
eration of Dutch Grocery and Food Industry (FNLI), the Central Office of Food and 
Grocery Trade – CBL), the association of Dutch catering organisations – Veneca, 
and the Royal Dutch Association for the Restaurant, Hotel and Catering Industry – 
KHN, with the aim of making the food industry more sustainable18  
While the Dutch government does not play an active role in this alliance, its repre-
sentatives attend the meetings in order to stay informed of the advancement of 
the VA. The specific roles of the authorities and the Alliance are described in the 
Agenda drafted in 2013 (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2013). The SFA has an oper-
ational role and is in direct contact with stakeholders, while the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs is in charge of the policy aspects at national and international level. 
Therefore, businesses took the lead of the VA, and the government’s role in the 
agreement switched from catalyser to facilitator. According to Toine Timmermans 
(WUR), this switch guaranteed a certain independence of VA members with regards 
to the changes of the public policy agenda (Timmermans 2017b) 
                                       
18 www.DuurzamerEten.nl [Accessed 14.12.2017]. 
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The ambitions of the SFA is to continue to scale up the successful projects of 
the SFP. Dissemination and coordination are also key activities of the alliance mak-
ing the involvement of relevant parties and sharing knowledge of great importance. 
Even for the scale-up of previous projects, the actors try to create as many links 
as possible with all stakeholders (farmers, animal feed companies, producers, ca-
tering industries, etc.) (SFA 2017d).  
The main outcomes of the first years (2013-2017) of the SFA are (SFA 2017a): 
 Increase in the level of sustainability throughout the chain (hotspots identified, 
instruments developed); the Sustainability Consortium defined Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) for product categories.  
 Reduction in food waste and optimisation of residual flow: even if the total 
amount of food waste in the Netherlands did not decrease significantly, the SFA 
managed to raise awareness, collaborate with food banks, and widen the focus 
of efforts to contribute towards the creation a circular economy.  
 Improvements in the meat supply chain, with results such as the setup of pilot 
projects, increase in chicken and pork (quality) standards in supermarkets, and 
a better consideration of environmental aspects.  
 Improvement in transparency and communication about sustainability, espe-
cially among private companies.  
Following these first conclusions, the SFA set up a new agenda for the coming years 
(2017-2020) with four main pillars (SFA 2017a): 
 Take the action to the next level. This means that by 2020, the objective is 
for all food in the Dutch market to be more sustainable (with a focus on the 
meat supply chain), and for all companies (farmers, manufacturers, retailers 
and caterers) to be engaged in this objective. This goal is set to be achieved 
through informational meetings, annual roundtable discussions and stakeholder 
dialogues, as well as research on hotspots. The idea is also to have a proper 
food waste measurement. 
 Bring circular economy into the agrifood sector. This is closely related to 
SDG 12.3. The objective is to eradicate the notion of waste from the supply 
chain, and to make all actors collaborate with each other to ensure this objec-
tive. To do so, the SFA stresses the importance of measuring, and joined with 
other groups working on the topic, like the TCEF and food banks, and developed 
the project CARVE (Snels 2017).  
 Transparency in the food chain. Facilitation and stimulation of data exchange 
to them to consumers is furthermore a core objective.  
 Monitoring, reporting and communication. This closely relates to the other 
pillars, since the actions include development and implementation of a sustain-
able food monitor, annual progress updates and sharing of best practices.  
The “No Waste Network” is the communication platform of the SFA at the initiative 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and involves third parties such as WUR Food & 
Biobased Research, the Netherlands Nutrition Centre and the Milieu Centraal Foun-
dation (No Waste Network 2017).  
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
57 
The creation of the Taskforce for Circular Economy in Food 
In January 2017, the government held the Dutch Food Summit, a multi-stakeholder 
discussion about the transition of food systems, which led to the formation of the 
TCEF. The role of the TCEF is to create links between all initiatives concerning food 
sustainability, and to help better organise the Dutch sustainable food system. In-
deed, it has been noted that it would be more efficient to unit all the dispersed 
initiatives in one common entity. Through the TCEF, the REFRESH project created 
the Dutch Framework for Action, aiming to gather actors from the whole food 
and drink value chain (major retailers, brands, government and non-governmental 
organisations) to agree a coordinated and collaborative approach to tackling food 
waste (Bygrave et al. 2017). The ambition is to rethink food systems with a 
circular economy approach, by shifting the focus from the individual steps at 
which food is wasted to the whole system, including agriculture, supply chain, busi-
nesses, waste management, etc. Significant improvements can be achieved by 
looking at the bigger picture.  
The TCEF operates as part of the program “The Netherlands Circular in 2050”, of 
which a milestone target is to halve consumption of raw materials between 2017 
and 2030 (Circulaire Economie 2017b). The TCEF is composed of a coalition of 
companies, with the coordination of WUR and the collaboration of the SFA and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. A distinction is made between signatories (with spe-
cific targets) and supporters (who back the actions and pilots, but without any 
target) (Bygrave et al. 2017). Strategies of the TCEF are set by a Steering Com-
mittee, which is also in charge to safeguard a transparent process for communica-
tion and monitoring progress. A representative of the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs is in the Steering Committee.  
Table 5. Objectives and impacts evolution through the VAs in the Netherlands. 
Phase 
Sustainable Food 
Platform (2008 – 
2013) 
Sustainable Food 
Alliance (2013 …) 
TCEF and Dutch 
Framework for Action 
(2017 – …) 
Signatories 
Agriculture             
Industry                     
Retail                            
Catering                   
Hospitality 
50,000 farmers                
100 animal feed 
firms 4300 super-
markets 90% of ca-
tering market 
40000 hotels             
Supervised by Wa-
geningen U&R. In-
cludes SFA as well as 
other food industrials, 
retailers, caterers, 
NGOs and the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. 
Objectives 
 




about food waste 
√+ 
20% reduction in 
food waste by 2020 
30% reduction in 
CO2 1990-2020 
Only sustainable 
meat by 2020. 
Unify all initiatives to 
reduce food waste. 
Halve consumption of 
raw materials 2017-
2030. 
Climate neutral food 




Toolbox to help 
companies optimize 
Signatories take con-
crete actions against 
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Platform (2008 – 
2013) 
Sustainable Food 
Alliance (2013 …) 
TCEF and Dutch 
Framework for Action 




group on food 
waste. Position pa-
per on labelling. 
Joint definition of 
food waste. 
all steps of produc-
tion and make high-
quality use of resid-
ual flows. 
Campaigns from the 
government, NGOs 
and the food sector. 
Not on path to 
achieve targets. 
food waste and report 
progress transparently. 
Work on national strat-
egy and roadmap for a 
circular food economy. 
Think tank, insights 
from REFRESH, share 
best practices, instru-
ments and progress re-
ports. 
Sources: SFA signatories (SFA 2017b), agenda (SFA 2017a), results (SFA 2017c), TCEF signatories 
(WUR 2017), goals (Dijksma and Kamp 2016), results (Circulaire Economie 2017b). 
Legend: X target missed √ target achieved √+ target exceeded. 
The TCEF aims to work on the following: 
 Defining a connected strategy (identification of hotspots /opportunities/ bar-
riers, long-term roadmap, etc.); 
 Developing the transition Agenda Circular Economy Biomass & Food. It is 
inspired by the national roadmap on circular economy; 
 Acquire business members. The target is 100 signatories and supporters by 
the end of 2018, and 40 by the end of 2017; 
 Launching pilots to create further evidence and support the realisation of 
existing ideas; 
 Achieving transparency on progress and actions, especially regarding the 
reporting of signatories; 
 Creating an ecosystem for solutions. The idea is to develop a “community of 
experts” and support the members’ innovations with tools; 
 Set up a portal of best practices, to share best practices, business cases, 
experiences, etc. among the businesses; 
 Framework for long-term consumer awareness campaign, connecting with 
existing initiatives and organisations.  
Monitoring and evaluating are key elements of the TCEF. While companies com-
mit themselves to reporting regularly, WUR (and where necessary other selected 
organisations) is responsible for the review of progress, taking into account confi-
dentiality. (Bygrave et al. 2017).  
Within this VA, pilot projects are carried out and supported by REFRESH in terms 
of capacity, knowledge, tools, network, etc. They have the ambition to take a col-
laborative and innovative research across the supply chain. The selection process 
for the pilots is currently being set up. There are already projects in good position 
to be selected for the first phase (e.g., “Oer-egg”, whose aim is to produce high 
quality eggs with sustainable practices, respectful of animals, by feeding chicken 
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with insects which, in turn, are fed on vegetable waste; or the project of the retail 
franchise Jumbo to run a living-lab pilot for six months to identify learnings and 
success factors to promote the sales of a wider category of food surplus products). 
5.3.3 Analysis of the policy and challenges 
Factors of success 
A favourable current international policy framework  
The VAs in the Netherlands are aligned with similar efforts by companies and gov-
ernments across the globe to reduce food waste. The Netherlands play a key role in 
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 12.3 to halve global per capita food 
waste between 2015 and 2030. The Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands 
is furthermore involved in the global scene by providing financial support to Cham-
pions 12.3. The idea of Champions 12.3 was proposed at the conference “No More 
Food To Waste” in The Hague in June 201519, and the Dutch government formally 
called for the creation of Champions 12.3 at the UN General Assembly’s Sustainable 
Development Summit in September 2015 (Champions 12.3 2016a). 
While the objectives of Champions 12.3 are not directly connected to the Dutch 
food waste policy, the Dutch government’s involvement implies that: 
 Dutch authorities deploy resources into sustainable food at both national and 
international levels; 
 The synergies with international non-EU policies should be considered even 
when looking at a specific country within the EU. 
Several members of Champions 12.3 are leading figures in the Dutch society and 
government, including Louise Fresco, the president of the Executive Board of WUR 
(Fresco 2017), and Hans Hoogeveen, ambassador and permanent representative 
of the Netherlands to the FAO (Champions 12.3 2016b) and (former) director-gen-
eral of Agro in the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Hoogeveen 2012). Both of them 
are also ambassadors for the TCEF (Circulaire Economie 2017b), recruiting food 
companies to join the TCEF and implement transition agendas targeting a circular 
economy in food in the Netherlands.  
Other members of Champions 12.3 are high-ranking executives of firms that have 
taken voluntary initiatives to reduce food waste, including in the Netherlands. The 
most prominent among these companies are Kellogg’s, with 60% waste to landfill 
reductions between 2005 and 2017 (Bryant 2017), and Nestlé, with a commitment 
to eliminate waste to landfill by 2020 (Bulcke 2017). 
Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands also funds the World Re-
sources Institute and the Food Loss & Waste Protocol. The latter organisation co-
ordinated the development of the Food Loss & Waste Accounting and Reporting 
                                       
19 https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2015/06/25/chair-s-summary-report-conference-
no-more-food-to-waste [Accessed 07.02.2017]. 
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Standard, a tool to quantify and measure food waste, and works to spread its use 
throughout the world. 
Synergies with national policy framework  
The Dutch VA is reinforced by increased consumer awareness developed in the past 
few years thanks to information campaigns and policies. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the “No Waste Network” sponsored and engaged in information cam-
paigns to reduce consumer waste (Vittuari et al. 2015). Research commissioned by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry for Infrastructure and the Envi-
ronment indicated that consumer waste decreased by 15% between 2010 and 2017 
(Holshuijsen 2017).  
Consumer awareness and sensitivity to food waste issues improved the public im-
age of food businesses signing the VAs. This incentive added to the financial ben-
efits thanks to a decrease in food waste, an increase in the operating efficiency, 
and the free consulting, in addition to R&D and information resources available to 
firms joining the VA. 
In October 2017, a coalition led by Mark Rutte’s VVD party formed a new govern-
ment in the Netherlands (Meijer 2017). The Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality, Carola Schouten, visited the TCEF at their home-base (Three Sixty), to-
gether with the EU-Commissioner Andriukaitis. Sigrid Kaag, the Minister of Foreign 
Trade and Development Cooperation met with Louise Fresco at Wageningen Univer-
sity on December 7th, 2017. Minister Kaag stated that the government would sup-
port Wageningen’s policies to reduce food waste, work to achieve the sustainable 
development goals and continue to cooperate with REFRESH (Sikkema 2017).  
Existing limitations 
Unstable food waste policy framework 
Currently, the Netherlands does not have a specific national food waste reduction 
target (besides the SDG 12.3 commitment). In the new government coalition, fur-
ther emphasis is put on the Climate Agenda and the development of a circular 
economy. A policy approach on circular economy seems to be the preferred ap-
proach to achieve food waste reduction in the Netherlands. The national roadmap, 
called “A Circular Economy in the Netherlands by 2050” presents a series of 
measures and goals aligned on five priorities partly based on the European Circular 
Economy Action Plan. The first priority, entitled “Biomass and food”, calls for “[…] 
combating (food) wastage”, and mentions the commitment to “minimise food 
waste” (Dijksma and Kamp 2016). Furthermore, the government places a focus “on 
monitoring, consumer information, revision of best-before dates, food banks, inno-
vation through the Agri & Food and Horticulture & Cultivation Materials Top Sectors, 
the removal of statutory obstacles, and positioning this topic on the European and 
global agendas” (Dijksma and Kamp 2016). In January 2018, the Roadmap Circular 
Economy Biomass and Food report has been handed over to the Government, and 
is waiting for further implementation (Transitie Team Circulaire Economie, 2018). 
As promising as this policy framework may be, it remains unclear what actions will 
be taken and over which timeframe, especially because 2050 is a long-term hori-
zon. This will mostly depend on the political choices made in the coming years. In 
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this regard, sustainable food is not expected to be a central question in the “Trust 
in the Future” coalition government formed in October 2017. However, two priori-
ties defined in the program of the largest party (the VVD) could have a direct impact 
on it, even if it is too early to draw any conclusion (Bruijn 2016): 
 Actions against climate change. It can have a negative impact regarding food 
waste, due to the diversion of flows of edible food or food dedicated to animal 
feed towards anaerobic digestion.  
 Sustainable livestock. Food waste could be a good driver to begin a transition 
towards a more sustainable livestock system.  
Because of the unstable policy framework, it is complicated to have a long-term 
vision. Since the government will probably not play a driving role in the sustainable 
food policy voluntary cooperation between businesses and organisations such as 
the REFRESH Framework for Action is central.  
Lack of an independent facilitator  
Measurements and agreements concerning food waste in the Netherlands lack ob-
jectivity. Only the government and a small number of businesses report their own 
food waste statistics (Timmermans 2017b). WUR organises information sharing 
among food companies, and publishes studies using aggregates of confidential 
company data, but the process of building trust among actors of the food chain 
who stand in direct competition with each other is difficult, as is the goal of guar-
anteeing the partakers in the agreement against accusations of anti-competitive 
behaviour (Vittuari et al. 2015). 
On the other hand, much of the information about food waste collected by private 
food companies is sensitive and confidential. Academic and research institutions 
such as WUR publish aggregated data that track the progress towards food waste 
reduction. The absence of a strong third party implies that information sharing 
among signatories and with the wider public is less efficient and recurrent than it 
could be (Soethoudt 2013; Vittuari et al. 2015).  
Absence of non-compliance sanctions 
The existing VAs in the Netherlands do not have built-in sanctions for non-compli-
ance. This makes it possible for free-riders to sign the agreement, learn what other 
signatories share, and benefit from the public image improvements while making 
only minimal changes to their own behaviour. In addition, the absence of a third 
party verifying waste reduction statistics makes it difficult to verify whether the 
changes reported have indeed occurred (Circulaire Economie 2017b). In the TCEF 
VA model, a step forward can be made to build in incentives and sanctions for non-
compliance by differentiation between signatories, supporters and non-members. 
 
5.4 Comparative analysis 
As anticipated in Section 5.1 Voluntary Agreements: definition and context, a VA is 
a non-mandatory alliance between any number of actors across different sectors, 
who come together to formally sign up to achieve a shared ambition or target.  
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The VAs for food waste reduction in the UK and the Netherlands were analysed as 
case studies to identify best practices and limitations of implementing and running 
such agreements, in addition to understanding ongoing dynamics within the national 
and international policy framework. This comparative analysis aims to put into per-
spective and highlight the learnings. Similarities and discrepancies show that even 
if each VA is intrinsically different, a number of factors can be extracted to explain 
the level of success, in particular: 
 The policy background at national and international levels; 
 The role of a third party and the interactions with the government; 
 The profile of the signatories and their involvement motivations; 
 An effective definition and measurement of the objectives. 
5.4.1 Context and background 
The UK’s VA, called Courtauld Commitment, started in 2005 and is now in its 
fourth phase (Courtauld 2025). Each phase of the CC has built on the results and 
findings of the previous ones, in order to fine-tune its objectives and targets. For 
example, the first phase of the CC was focused on reducing packaging as well as 
food waste at household level, while from the second CC onwards, food waste tar-
gets were reinforced, and the scope was broadened to the entire supply chain (not 
just the household sector). As of today, the CC is the world-leading VA on food 
waste (WRAP 2016c).  
Compared to the UK, the Netherlands did not set up one main VA. It instead set 
up several VAs such as the SFP and its successor, the Sustainable Food Alliance 
(SFA). The scope of the Dutch agreements is slightly different from that of the UK 
one, because they work more generally on the sustainability of the whole food 
system (Duurzamereten n.d.). In 2017, the TCEF was created in the Netherland 
to unify all voluntary efforts to reduce food waste into one large VA. Through the 
TCEF, the REFRESH project created the Dutch Framework for Action, aiming to 
gather actors from the whole food and drink value chain to agree a coordinated 
and collaborative approach to tackling food waste (Bygrave et al. 2017). 
5.4.2 Comparison of the policy backgrounds 
National policy frameworks  
The policy frameworks of the two countries had an influence on how the VAs were 
carried out. The food waste situation in UK and the Netherlands at the early 
start of the VAs was fundamentally different, and may thus be used to illustrate 
the need for a widespread investment in the VA. In 2005, the UK lagged behind other 
EU countries in terms of actions to prevent food and packaging waste, and the re-
sources consequently placed into WRAP correspond to a realisation by the govern-
ment that the waste of food and packaging needed to be firmly addressed.  
A key finding is that the success of VAs relies heavily on a country’s policy context. 
While the VA in the UK was implemented instead of legislation, as a political move 
to avoid having the government implement binding legislation, in the Netherlands 
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the SFP was used as a tool to achieve the 20% reduction target set by the 
government. Although in Scotland and Wales quantitative objectives were set, in 
England there are no such objectives but only a direction (Scotl et al. 2016b). In 
England, the threat of government intervention acted as a type of sanction for non-
compliance for the entire sector. This promoted the success of the first step of the 
CC (CC1), which set off a favourable dynamic for the achievement of subsequent 
CCs. The agreement has superseded the usual law-making process in the UK while 
in the Netherlands VAs were initially considered a tool to reach government targets. 
It should be noted, however, that VAs in Wales and Scotland were successful even 
though they were used as tools to assist regulatory measures, not to replace them. 
This shows that VAs and regulations can interact in different ways, depending 
on the policy framework of each country and that a specific setup is no guarantee 
of success.  
 
Synergies with international policies 
VAs in both the UK and the Netherlands pursue aims similar to the Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 12.3, which calls for halving per capita global food 
waste at both retail and consumer levels, and for reducing food losses along pro-
duction and supply chains (including postharvest losses) by 2030 (Champions 12.3 
2017). The two VAs are also strengthened by the participation of experts working 
at the same time within Champions 12.3 and at national level. The Champions 
12.3 is a group gathering governments’ executives, businesses, international or-
ganisations, research institutions, farmer groups, and civil society organisations. It 
works towards achieving SDG Target 12.3 (Champions 12.3 2016b).  
Cooperation with international organisations fosters the sharing of good 
practices and feedbacks. It also ensures that companies can rely on experts in 
charge of VAs in other countries to be aware of targets or regulations on food waste 
set by other organisations on a national or international level that may conflict with 
the national VA (Mahon 2017). 
The VAs in the Netherlands and the UK may have benefited from European legisla-
tion and communication. Indeed, the 2004 Communication of the EC ‘Partner-
ship for change in an enlarged Europe – enhancing the contribution of Eu-
ropean social dialogue’ (COM(2004) 557 final, 12 August 2004) calls for the 
formation of VAs. Article 154(3) TFEU states that the EC will suspend its legislative 
initiatives if social partners enter into VAs (EurWORK 2012). In 2016, the European 
Court of Auditors called for a coherent, ambitious policy on food waste in Europe 
with concrete objectives. It was partly in response to this call that WUR and the 
Dutch government initiated the TCEF (Timmermans 2017a). Since regulations at 
European level apply for all MS, the policy framework is similar for the Netherlands 
and UK, even if Brexit might cause the UK’s legislative framework to evolve, while 
Dutch legislation often goes beyond EU recommendations. Note that, despite the 
favourable EU communications listed above, EU laws have diverse direct or in-
direct impacts on food waste. 
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5.4.3 The role of an independent convener and interactions with the 
government 
The role of the independent lead organisation  
In the context of VAs, a “third party” is an entity that is neither the government 
nor businesses, but an independent and neutral organisation in charge of delivering 
the VA. One of the most significant differences between VAs in the Netherlands and 
in the UK is the presence of WRAP as a strong third party with a dedicated role to 
coordinate the CC. By comparison, the TCEF and the SFA are forums for dialogue 
between stakeholders in the food sector but no entity is in charge of overall super-
vision. WUR performs studies on food waste reduction techniques and participated 
in the creation of the TCEF as part of the REFRESH framework for action, but does 
not supervise either the SFA or the TCEF.  
The third party in VAs must build trust by guaranteeing the confidentiality of data 
provided by the signatories but also work to encourage participants who stand in 
direct competition to work together on a win-win situation. This includes protecting 
signatories against accusations of anti-competitive behaviour. WRAP facilitates the 
organisation of a forum for exchange on food waste reduction by stating at the 
beginning of each meeting the rules to be followed, and by certifying if need be in 
court that these rules were indeed followed (Mahon 2017b).  
The comparison between UK and the Netherlands demonstrates how the facilita-
tion of the VA by an independent third party is a best practice.  
Government role and involvement  
Since a VA is very often initiated by authorities, the question of government fund-
ing is central. Ensuring a public budget for a VA is likely to foster its success, but 
the question of governmental influence on the food waste reduction agenda and 
on access to data is particularly sensitive. Indeed, WRAP is financed by the gov-
ernment (although it is not managed by it), whereas WUR and the TCEF do not 
have specifically allocated budget for monitoring the Netherlands’ food waste (RE-
FRESH 2017). 
In parallel of the financial issues, shifts in political priorities can endanger a VA 
if it is dependent on government support. The Dutch government redefined its food 
waste policy in 2012, which led to the end of the SFP. Even if companies decided to 
continue their collaboration in the SFA, the authorities played a less preponderant 
role. On the UK side, WRAP has always benefited from continuous government fund-
ing, and this stability was a key element to ensure a more long-term vision. None-
theless, the critical point is that WRAP’s independence from government in terms 
of supervision is clear to companies participating in the CC. These then trust WRAP 
with information they would not have provided to the government (Mahon 2017). 
5.4.4 Profile of the signatories and involvement motivations 
Representation of signatories 
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In both UK and the Netherlands, VAs are strengthened by the representation 
of actors along the whole supply chain, which ensures that food waste is 
considered from all angles during the VA’s make-up (SFA 2017d). For example, 
the last phase of the CC, Courtauld 2025, includes 156 signatories representing more 
than 90% of the food retail market and working on the entire life cycle of products.  
In the Netherlands, the SFA includes actors from all the supply chain: the Nether-
lands Agriculture and Horticulture Organization, the Dutch Food Industry Federation, 
the Centraal Bureau Levensmiddelenhandel (represents the collective interests of 
the supermarket sector and food service companies), the Association of Dutch Ca-
tering Organizations, Koninklijke Horeca Nederland (catering companies) and the 
Dutch Animal Feed Industry Association. The TCEF could arguably be considered as 
having a wider and more diversified scope of actors since it includes the SFA, many 
retailers, food and packaging industrials in addition to the government, REFRESH, 
NGOs, and financial and IT firms (WUR 2017).  
Furthermore, within both countries’ VAs, the participating signatories are CEOs 
or high-level managers within their companies, who have a direct influence on 
resource allocation. This facilitates the decision-making process for implement-
ing the various measures laid out in the VAs. 
It should be noted that in the UK, in addition to these high-level signatories, NGOs 
were invited by WRAP in the early stages of the CC to help define its agenda, includ-
ing food banks that later participated in food distribution as part of the VA (Mahon 
2017). Instead, in the Netherlands, the choice was made not to solicit the par-
ticipation of NGOs. Rather, the government and signatory companies worked to-
gether to set forth a food waste reduction agenda. In the current phase (the TCEF 
model), NGOs participate as members. 
Benefits for businesses: having a strong business case 
The VAs in the UK and the NL successfully communicated the potential ben-
efits for signatory companies to join in their VAs, as they saw how their 
involvement had a strong business case.  
VAs in both the UK and the Netherlands result in indirect financial gains to com-
panies due to the increased efficiency, the reduction in production that would oth-
erwise go to waste and the free knowledge and skills obtained from other partici-
pants and from third parties. VAs also strengthen customer relationships, re-
tention, and loyalty resulting from efforts by companies to help customers reduce 
food waste at home. Though this applies in particular to those who are directly in 
contact with consumers (retailers, caterers and others), there are also non-financial 
advantages for companies in helping their upstream suppliers reduce food waste 
because the collaboration can develop into another win-win situation (Hanson 
and Mitchell 2017).  
One common point of the VAs in the Netherlands and the CC is that the benefits 
for businesses do not build on direct financial incentives from the govern-
ment to implement the policies suggested in the VA. Experience has shown 
that businesses joined the VAs in UK and the Netherlands despite the absence of 
direct financial incentives, but such incentives could be used as a lever to encourage 
more active participation in the VA. In Courtauld 2025, signatories even agree to 
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give a financial contribution to WRAP. During the VA, participants’ reductions in 
food waste and GHG emissions through both food donations and increases in effi-
ciency are recorded, so one possibility may be to allow participant companies to 
deduct these reductions from their taxes (Dawson and Segerson 2008). 
Lack of supporting legislation or non-compliance sanctions 
As with the CC in UK, the VAs in the Netherlands do not have built-in sanctions for 
non-compliance. In certain cases, it was seen that this instils a sense of responsi-
bility in the signatories to ensure implementation of the VA’s actions, while in other 
cases, this fostered passive participation of signatories.  
The large number of signatories in the Courtauld 2025 has led to inequalities in the 
involvement of companies. The risk is that firms learn from good practices shar-
ing and benefit from the public image improvements but make only minimal 
changes to their own behaviour (economic problem of the “free-rider”).  
The context of the SFA is slightly different since there are a limited number of sig-
natories working in collaboration without any third party. Therefore, the success 
of the SFA strongly relies on the involvement of each member. If the TCEF 
achieves its growth targets, companies may be tempted to passively hide behind 
the progress of their competitors which would go unsanctioned since neither WRAP 
nor the Steering Committee of the TCEF would oust a company from their respec-
tive VAs. It is the role of the leading organisation (WRAP or steering committee of 
the TCEF) to ensure no such situations exist, otherwise this may question the par-
ticipation of some companies (Mahon 2017). One possibility to strengthen the VAs 
on food waste may be to introduce a minimum participation constraint to combat 
free riders (Carraro, Brau, and Golfetto 2001). 
5.4.5 The importance of definition and measurement of the objectives 
An illustration of the cooperation in a VA: the definition of the objectives  
The participants to VAs in both countries were able to agree on a common mes-
sage despite the intense level of competition in the food industry. The food indus-
try, and particularly retailers, engage in awareness-raising campaigns and use their 
products to carry messages on food waste. Consumers proved receptive to these 
messages and this the right path to follow to reduce food waste in both countries, 
as the major contribution to it comes from the consumer sector (Netherlands Nu-
trition Centre 2014).  
Besides cooperation, a VA works best if signatories collectively set ambitious yet 
achievable targets with clear deadlines and metrics. In each of its four phases, 
the signatories to the CC defined quantitative targets. Although always centred on 
food waste, the priorities of the CC were adapted over the years, based on the 
political and environmental scene regarding food waste at the establishment of 
each CC. For example, different focuses in each of the CCs are: packaging waste 
in CC1, carbon impact, GHG, water emissions, etc. This is a major reason why 
the CC is now in its fourth phase and has achieved most of the targets set in each 
of the previous steps. On the Dutch side, the SFP was started to achieve the 20% 
reduction target imposed to the participants. These dissimilarities in defining the 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
67 
objectives might be a reason to explain the difference of success between the 
VAs.  
Importance of reporting consistency and transparency 
VAs are most effective if signatories provide precise data concerning their food 
waste. Each signatory’s data is to be kept confidential, but the process by which 
the data is aggregated should be transparent. In the context of the CC, signatories 
provide WRAP with data concerning their level of food waste and, then, WRAP 
aggregates the data and uses a model to determine how much of the observed 
food waste reduction is directly influenced by companies’ application of the 
CC. The process by which WRAP aggregates the data is audited by an external 
company, though the data itself is kept confidential. WRAP verifies food waste sta-
tistics reported by individual companies but keeps that sensitive information confi-
dential, and only publishes aggregated data about national food waste (as it did in 
2007, 2009 and 2012).  
On the other hand, statistics about food waste in the Netherlands are not aggregates 
of accurate individual statistics but extrapolations from a limited number of reports 
by a small number of businesses (Timmermans 2017b). During the SFP and SFA, 
studies were performed to assess food waste that relied only on very limited com-
pany data, first because only a fraction of companies participated in these agree-
ments, and second because even the companies which participated did not neces-
sarily reveal their food waste statistics. The 20% food waste reduction target be-
tween 2008 and 2015 was, therefore, measured based on food waste streams data 
(Vittuari et al. 2015). It is difficult to verify that changes reported have indeed 
occurred, and implies that information sharing between signatories and with 
the wider public is less efficient and regular in the Netherlands than in the UK 
(Soethoudt 2013; Vittuari et al. 2015). If WRAP and the CC have acquired a strong 
credibility, it is in part because they use a transparent monitoring system. For 
example, in Sweden the availability of transparent data is seen as a driver for set-
ting up of a VA, both by the government and by companies (Tillväxtverket 2017). 
5.4.6 Conclusion 
VAs in the UK and in the Netherlands have been studied in detail and a number of 
recommendations have emerged for other countries wanting to introduce VAs to 
reduce food waste in the agri-food sector. 
 The national and international political context greatly influences (either 
positively or negatively) the framework and success of a VA. Indeed, research 
demonstrated that political agenda and VAs are really tight –at least during the 
early phases. The VAs in line with national and international objectives may 
have more relevance than those that have unilateral objectives. VAs can be 
tools to implement legislation or alternatives to legislation.  
 A VA’s funding scheme impacts its lifetime and agenda. For example, VAs 
that receive governmental/private funding are influenced by national/company 
priorities and budgetary constraints. VAs receiving public funding are sensitive 
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to changes in political agendas. Privately funded VAs run the risk of being de-
signed according to the largest contributors’ priorities. VAs that rely on an ap-
propriate balance between funding sources may be most stable and effective.  
 The role played by a neutral third party (on top of firms and the government) 
is preponderant, notably to facilitate the accession of actors to join the VA, to 
ensure confidentiality of data or to supervise the agreement. The third party is 
also useful to ensure a wide representation of actors from the whole supply 
chain. This in turn is essential to tackle food waste from field to plate.  
 Besides external pressure, the involvement of businesses depends on whether 
there is a strong enough business case: companies must gain benefits one way 
or another from joining a VA. A VA should find a balance to find ambitious yet 
realistic targets achievable by its signatories. The robustness and the trans-
parency of data reporting are critical to ensure the credibility of the initiatives.  
The UK and the Dutch VAs met with different levels of success in terms of magnitude 
of actions, quantitative results and number of actors gathered. Indeed, they are not 
built on the same ambitions and aspiration schemes, and do not rely on the same 
support and financial means. However, these two countries are at the forefront of 
Europe on the question of voluntary cooperation to reduce food waste. Their com-
parison shed light on the best practices to adopt and the essential issues to avoid.  
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6   Lessons learnt and recommendations  
6.1 What do the comparative case studies tell us about 
policy tools against UTPs? 
Chapter 4  described and compared two national-level regulations to tackle UTPs: 
the UK’s Groceries Supply Code of Practice (GSCOP), with its monitoring body, 
the Groceries Code Adjudicator, established in 2013, and Italy’s art. 62 of law 
decree 1/2012 (“Urgent regulations for fair competition, infrastructure develop-
ment, and competitiveness”), whose observance is monitored by the Italian Na-
tional Competition Authority (AGCM). The former is an evolution of an earlier vol-
untary approach, the UK Supermarket Code of Practice (SCOP), while the latter 
represents the adoption, in Italy, of the European Principles of Good Practices in 
the Food Supply Chain in Italy, as UTPs were previously addressed by means of the 
law on subcontracting. Due to their different adoption dynamics, and to the differ-
ences in the legal systems of the UK and Italy, these two measures achieved dif-
ferent outcomes. The analysis of points of strength and of weakness allowed to 
identify opportunities and threats to be considered when designing EU or MS legis-
lation against UTPs. 
If the EU wants to pass a directive on UTPs, the definition of the practices forbidden 
and of the subjects involved should be as general as possible, thus allowing MSs to 
adapt it to their specific market situation, avoiding complications in the prosecution 
phase. No limitations should be allowed based on the residence of the victim (inside 
or outside the country), or on her position within the food supply chain. Furthermore, 
by starting with an exploratory phase made of VAs among large retailers, MSs could 
collect information that will allow them to design better regulation later. Policymak-
ers should also foresee sufficient funding for the monitoring body, carry out inde-
pendent market investigation, and allow confidential claims. As for the implications 
of UTPs in terms of food waste, it is crucial to design an organisational structure 
for redistributing the surplus food generated by UTPs like order cancellations.  
Based on the case studies, a set of specific recommendations are drafted below: 
1 An exploratory period by means of VAs among large retailers, like the SCOP in 
the UK, could be beneficial to identify the right strategy to tackle UTPs and avoid 
a regulatory approach in case the suasive one emerges as effective;  
2 Comprehensive market surveys should be implemented during the exploratory 
period to assess the effectiveness of the VA, and draw a better legislation later; 
3 Food waste levels within the supply chain are a useful indicator of UTPs and 
could be used to assess the success of interventions to tackle UTPs: this requires 
measurement and transparency across the supply chain; 
4 The authority responsible for identifying and fighting UTPs should be lean and 
focused, like the UK’s GCA, while having access to experts, the power to launch 
own investigations, and sufficient funding, preferably its own (e.g., the money 
obtained from the fines inflicted); 
5 The definition of UTPs should be as general as possible (e.g. “any conduct in 
which one of the parts of an agreement makes use of its market power to obtain 
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advantages that the other part would not obtain if adopting the same conduct”); 
indeed, many details cause persecution to become harder; 
6 Indirect suppliers should be protected by the law, differently from what fore-
seen in the UK, as the effects of UTPs are transmitted upward in the supply chain; 
7 Foreign suppliers (not only citizens of another EU MS) should be protected by 
the norms, e.g. by introducing mechanisms to ensure that the contracts signed 
abroad respect these norms, and by foreseeing, as a criterion to assess the au-
thority’s jurisdiction, the fact that the good is purchased by a stakeholder based 
in the MS; indeed, the food supply chain is international in nature; 
8 The possibility for the authority to start independent investigations, and for 
the victims to fill confidential complaints, not foreseen in Italy, is important 
to overcome the "fear factor"; 
9 Fines should be proportional to the size of the damage and/or to the turnover 
of the wrongdoer, like in the UK, otherwise they have no deterrent effect; 
10 The monitoring authority could be empowered to declare the agreement and its 
effects “null and void ab initio”, and to ask for compensation from the wrong-
doer without any need for the victim to claim to ordinary courts, unlike in Italy; 
11 Comprehensive surveys comparing retailer practices should be carried out to 
allow rankings of compliance, as they are an effective way to ensure retailers 
compete to be the most compliant with the requirements of the legislation;  
12 To address the potential food waste resulting from UTPs, the wrongdoer could 
be forced to sell the surplus generated within its selling points, and/or to buy 
the product involved from the victim for a minimum period. However, the in-
vestigation’s findings may arrive months or years later, so the opportunity to 
rescue the surplus is long gone. However, the idea that the fines should go to 
support food rescue operations remains valid. 
In general, enforcement of EU standards, frameworks and recommendations should 
be consistent amongst MSs, otherwise there might be a risk of retailers moving 
their purchasing operations to EU MSs where UTPs are not regulated. 
 
6.2 What do the comparative case studies tell us about 
VAs? 
Chapter 5  described and compared two national-level VAs to tackle food waste: 
the UK’s Courtauld Commitment (CC), which started in 2005 and is still in place 
today, and the Dutch initiatives now centralised around the Taskforce for Circular 
Economy in Food (TCEF), born in January 2017. The former, funded by all UK 
Devolved Administrations and delivered by the Waste & Resources Action Pro-
gramme (WRAP), has undergone four phases, the last being Courtauld 2025 (2016-
2025). The TCEF represents the latest evolution of the Sustainable Food Platform, 
launched by the government in 2008, which became the Sustainable Food Alliance 
in 2013, with businesses taking the lead and the government acting as a facilitator. 
Due to the different timing and dynamics which lead to the launching of these VAs, 
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their outcome in terms of food waste reduction as of today are also different. While 
the UK as a long history of suasive policies to address food waste, with private 
initiative playing a prominent role, the Netherlands started exploring this route 
thanks catalyst role of the government; nevertheless, sizeable improvements have 
been taking place during the last years. The comparative analysis allows to identify 
implications of each approach, and draw recommendations for policymakers inter-
ested in creating an enabling environment for the signing of VAs. 
The main messages emerged through the comparative analysis are provided below: 
1 First, the national and international political context greatly affects (positively 
or negatively) the framework and success of a VA. Indeed, this research demon-
strated that political agendas and VAs are very tight – at least during the early 
phases. The VAs which are in line with national and international objectives may 
have more relevance than those having unilateral objectives; 
2 A VA’s funding scheme impacts its lifetime and agenda. For example, VAs that 
receive governmental/private funding are likely to be influenced by national/com-
pany priorities and budgetary constraints; 
3 The role played by a neutral third party (primarily firms, NGOs, or the govern-
ment) is preponderant, notably to facilitate the accession of supply chain stake-
holders to the VA, ensure confidentiality of data, or supervise the agreement;  
4 Representation of actors from the whole supply chain is crucial to tackle the 
issue of food waste from the field to the plate; 
5 Besides external pressure, the successful involvement of businesses depends 
on whether there is strong enough business case: companies must gain benefits, 
one way or another, from joining the VA; 
6 A VA should find a balance to identify ambitious yet realistic targets, achiev-
able by its signatories; the robustness and the transparency of data reporting are 
critical to ensure the credibility of the initiatives; 
7 Finally, VAs can be a tool to implement better regulation but also an alternative 
to it, depending on the context and on their success. 
 
6.3 What generalizations can be made? 
The four case studies and the pairwise comparative analyses provided common in-
sights to understand policy processes, thus identifying relevant aspects to consider, 
as well as practices to replicate (and why), and other practices to avoid (and why). 
Since every MS has a different starting situation as for VAs and regulations to tackle 
UTPs, a common EU framework would be crucial to harmonize national approaches, 
guiding the MSs whose governments are going to take targeted actions. As for VAs, 
this common EU framework could define the best practices for launching them, in-
cluding definitional standards, targets to be reached for achieving awards and/or 
environmental quality labels, etc. As for the regulation against UTPs, the framework 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
72 
could include at least compulsory definitions, penalties as well as best practices to 
address the “fear factor” and other critical issues. 
The framework should be common but flexible enough, because the market situa-
tion (concentration, fragmentation, vertical integration) differs in all countries, and 
all actors of the food supply chain should be involved in the process of policy design. 
Suasive approaches, like VAs, and regulatory approaches, like legislation to tackle 
UTPs, should not be seen as competitive or conflicting measures, but either as phases 
of a single policy strategy aimed at addressing food waste, or as connected inter-
ventions to be implemented in parallel, due to the specific advantages entailed by 
each of them. 
Following the methodological protocol designed in this report, the analysis could 
be extended to the EU MSs not considered here, thus setting the starting point for 
better targeted policy intervention in the field of UTPs and/or VAs. The recommen-
dations provided above may help policymakers design better-framed interventions, 
generating a positive impact on the prevention, reduction, reuse and valorisation 
of food and packaging waste. UTPs and the lack of vertical and horizontal cooper-
ation in the food supply chain damages weaker actors, like small farmers and final 
consumers. Therefore, the prevention of unfair conducts and of food waste by means 
of either suasive or regulatory approaches can have an indirect positive impact on 
the whole society and the environment, beyond market stability. A multi-stake-
holder governance of the food supply chain, facilitated by VAs involving a large 
range of actors, could generate benefits also in terms of reduced UTPs. Indeed, 
these actors could easily interact with one another, sharing the positive and nega-
tive reputation of virtuous firms and wrongdoers, and imitating successful innova-
tions to address food waste. When this suasive approach is not successful, or draw-
ing on this experience, policymakers might prioritize the introduction of stricter reg-




D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
73 
7   References 
Agri Rete Service. 2016. Osservatorio della cooperazione agricola italiana. Rapporto 
2016. http://www.osservatorio-cooperazione-agricola.it/images/Rapport/2016/2016_Os-
servatorio_cooperazione_2016.pdf [Accessed 19.12.2017]. 
Bardach, E. 2012. A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis. The Eightfold Path to More Ef-
fective Problem Solving. Fourth Edition. London (UK): SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Bruijn, J.A. 2016. Zeker Nederland- VVD verkiezingsprogramma 2017-2021. VVD. 
https://vvd.nl/content/uploads/2016/11/vvd_verkiezingsprogramma_pages.pdf [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 




Bryden, A., Petticrew, M., Mays, N., Eastmure, E., Knai, C. 2013. Voluntary agree-
ments between government and business - a scoping review of the literature with specific 
reference to the Public Health Responsibility Deal. Health Policy (Amsterdam, Nether-
lands), 110(2–3), 186–197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.02.009  
Bulcke, P. 2017. Waste and recovery. http://www.nestle.com/csv/planet/product-life-
cycle/waste-and-recovery [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Burgos, S., Gheoldus, M., Colin, F., Stenmarck, A., Hultén. J., Yohanan, L., Parfitt, J., 
Vittuari, M., Piras, S., McFarland, K., Wunder, S. (2017). “Systems maps and analytical 
framework. Mapping food waste drivers across the food supply chain”, EU Horizon 2020 
REFRESH. Deloitte, La Défense, France. https://eu-refresh.org/mapping-food-waste-dri-
vers-across-food-supply-chain   
Burgos, S., Colin, F., Gheoldus, M., Graf, V. (2018). “Policy Brief: Voluntary Agree-
ments as a collaborative solution for food waste reduction”, EU Horizon 2020 REFRESH. 
Deloitte, La Défense, France.  
Bygrave, K., Rogers, D., Eisenhauer, P., Bruggemann, N., Timmermans, T., Cseh, B., 
Lopez-i-Gelats, F., Díaz-Ruiz, R. 2017. Frameworks for Action: Selection Process. EU Hori-
zon 2020 REFRESH. 
Carraro, C., Brau, R., Golfetto, G. 2001. Participation Incentives and the Design of Vol-
untary Agreements (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 275872. Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=275872 [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Champions 12.3. 2016a. About Champions 12.3. https://champions123.org/about/ 
[Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Champions 12.3. 2016b. The Champions. https://champions123.org/the-champions/ 
[Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Champions 12.3. 2017. SDG Target 12.3 on food loss and waste/ 2017 Progress re-
port. https://champions123.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/champions-123-sdg-target-
123-2017-progress-report.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Ciconte, F., Liberti, S. 2017. Supermercati, il grande inganno del sottocosto. In: Inter-
nazionale. https://www.internazionale.it/reportage/fabio-ciconte/2017/02/27/supermer-
cati-inganno-sotto-costo [Accessed 04.09.2017]. 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
74 
Circulaire Economie. 2017a. Programma ‘Nederland Circulair in 2050’. http://www.cir-
culaireeconomienederland.nl/rijksbreed+programma+circulaire+economie/default.aspx 
[Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Circulaire Economie. 2017b. Taskforce Circular Economy in Food. Available Online: 
http://www.circulaireeconomienederland.nl/ondertekenaars/taskforce+circular+econ-
omy+in+food/default.aspx [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Competition Commission. 2008. The supply of groceries in the UK market investigation. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402235418/http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-inquiry/rep_pub/re-
ports/2008/fulltext/538.pdf [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
Dawson, N.L., Segerson, K. 2008. “Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation 
Incentives with Industry-Wide Targets.” Land Economics, 84(1), 97–114. 
De Franceschi, A. 2015. “Recent evolutions regarding contractual restrictions on the 
assignment of claims. The need for a more systematic approach.” Osservatorio del Diritto 
Civile e Commerciale, 2, 481-520. 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 2016. The Groceries Code 
Adjudicator Review: Part 2 - Call for Evidence on the case for extending the GCA’s remit. 
https://beisgovuk.citizenspace.com/gca/groceries-code-adjudicator-review-part2/ [Ac-
cessed 23.03.2018]. 




Dijksma, S., Kamp, H.G.J. 2016. A circular economy in the Netherlands by 2050. Minis-
try for the Environment and Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
 Ellen MacArthur Foundation. 2015. Courtauld Commitment. https://www.ellenmacar-
thurfoundation.org/programmes/government/toolkit-for-policymakers/case-studies/cour-
tauld-commitment [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
European Commission. 2009. Impact assessment guidelines. http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf [Accessed 
19.04.2017].  
European Commission. 2013. Green Paper “Unfair trading practices in the business-to-
business food and non-food supply chain in Europe. COM(2013) 37 final. Brussels (Bel-
gium): European Union. 
European Commission. 2014. Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-busi-
ness food supply chain. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions. COM(2014) 472 final. Brussels (Belgium): European Union. 
European Commission. 2015. Better regulation “toolbox”. http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/index_en.htm [Accessed 19.04.2017]. 
European Commission. 2016a. Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on unfair business-to-business trading practices in the food supply 
chain. COM(2016) 32 final. Brussels (Belgium): European Union.  
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
75 
European Commission. 2016b. Unfair business-to-business trading practices in the food 
supply chain”. COM(2016) 32 final. 
European Commission. 2017a. Inception Impact Assessment – Initiative to Improve 
the Food Supply Chain. Ares(2017)3735472 – 25/07/2017. 
European Commission. 2017b. Speech at FSAI Conference on “Safeguarding the Food 




European Court of Auditors. 2016. Combating food waste: an opportunity for the EU to 
improve the resource-efficiency of the food supply chain. Special Report No. 34. Brussels 
(Belgium): European Union. 
EurWORK. 2012. European social dialogue. Eurofound, Wyattville Road, Loughlinstown, 
Co. Dublin, D18 KP65, Ireland: EuroFound. https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observato-
ries/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/european-social-dialogue [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 
Fałkowski, J., Ménard, C., Sexton R.J., Swinnen, J., Vandevelde, S. (Authors), Di Mar-
cantonio, F., Ciaian, P. (Editors). 2017 Unfair trading practices in the food supply chain: A 
literature review on methodologies, impacts and regulatory aspects. European Commis-
sion: Joint Research Centre. 
Feedback. 2006. Food Waste Archives. https://feedbackglobal.org/tag/food-waste/ 
[Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Feedback. 2015. Food waste in Kenya: uncovering food waste in the horticultural sup-
ply chain. https://feedbackglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Food-Waste-in-
Kenya_report-by-Feedback.pdf [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 




Feedback. 2018 (publication pending). Farmers talk food waste: Supermarkets’ role in 
crop waste on UK farms. Will be available at: http://feedbackglobal.org/wp/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/02/Farm_waste_report.pdf. 
Food Ethics Council. 2012. Working better together: Lessons for effective government-
business collaboration. https://www.foodethicscouncil.org/uploads/publications/Work-
ing_better_together_-_report_of_the_roundtable.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Fresco, L. 2017. September 20. Louise O. Fresco – homepage (in English). 
http://www.louiseofresco.com/HTML/UK_Index.html [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Goodwin, L. 2013. The Courtauld Commitment Phase 2 Final Results. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Courtauld%20Commitment%202%20Fi-
nal%20Results.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Goodwin, L. 2016. The root of the UK’s food waste success story - Courtauld | WRAP 
UK. http://www.wrap.org.uk/blog/2016/03/root-uk%E2%80%99s-food-waste-success-
story-courtauld [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
76 
Grievink, J.W. 2003. “The Changing Face of the Global Food Industry”, presentation 
made at the OECD Conference, The Hague, 6 February 2003. http://ernaehrungs-
denkwerkstatt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/EDWText/TextElemente/Han-
del/OECD_Food_Trade_Business_Trends-GrievinkPPT.pdf [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
Groceries Code Adjudicator. 2014. Annual Report 23 June 2013 – 31 March 2014. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/322415/10143-GCA-Annual_Report_2014.pdf [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
Groceries Code Adjudicator. 2016. Tesco breached Code. https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/news/tesco-breached-code [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
Hanson, C., Mitchell, P. 2017. The business case for reducing food loss and waste. 
Champions 12.3. https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/fw_lib_business-
case_en.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Her Majesty’s Government. 2018. Government response to the Call for Evidence on the 




Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewig, F., Podszun, R. 2013. “Comments of the Max Planck In-
stitute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Munich of 29 April 2013 on the 
Green Paper of the European Commission on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-
Business Food and Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe Dated 31 January 2013, COM(2013) 
37 Final.” International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 44(6): 701-
709. 
Holshuijsen, K. 2017. Food waste falls 15 percent in the Netherlands | NL Times. NL 
Times. https://nltimes.nl/2017/05/24/food-waste-falls-15-percent-netherlands [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 
Hoogeveen, H. 2012. Hans Hoogeveen. Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Stud-
ies. https://environment.yale.edu/gem/advisory-board/hoogeveen/#gsc.tab=0 [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 
House of Commons. 2017. Food waste in England. Eighth Report of Session 2016-17. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmenvfru/429/429.pdf [Ac-
cessed 07.02.2018]. 
International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM) and 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2016. Mediterra 2016. 
Zero Waste in the Mediterranean. Natural Resources, Food and Knowledge. Paris 
(France): Presses de Sciences Po. 
Mahon, P. 2017. Interview with Patrick Mahon -Wrap UK. October 13, 2017. 
Marks, S. 2017. Brussels declares war on supermarkets. In: Politico. http://www.poli-
tico.eu/article/carrefour-tesco-asda-sainsbury-leclerc-intermarche-brussels-declares-war-
on-supermarkets/ [Accessed 18.10.2017]. 
McKevitt, F. 2017. “Lidl becomes the UK’s seventh largest supermarket.” Kantar UK In-
sights. 22 August 2017.  http://uk.kantar.com/consumer/shoppers/2017/september-kan-
tar-worldpanel-uk-grocery-share/ [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
77 
Meijer, B. 2017. New Dutch government sworn in after record negotiations. October 
26, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-government/new-dutch-gov-
ernment-sworn-in-after-record-negotiations-idUSKBN1CV15D [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands. 2013. Agenda for Sustainable Food 
2013-2016. http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/pbl-2016-sustainable-
development-in-the-Netherlands_1966.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands. 2014. Facts and figures on consumer 
food waste in 2013. https://www.government.nl/documents/publica-
tions/2014/01/30/facts-and-figures-on-consumer-food-waste-in-2013 [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 
National Farmers Union. 2016. Groceries Code Adjudicator's report on Tesco. 
https://www.nfuonline.com/news/latest-news/groceries-code-adjudicators-report-on-
tesco/ [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
National Farmers Union. 2017. NFU members press concerns of unfair trading. 
https://www.nfuonline.com/sectors/food-chain/food-chain-news/nfu-members-press-con-
cerns-of-unfair-trading/ [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 




No Waste Network. 2017. About NWN. http://www.nowastenetwork.nl/en/nwn/ [Ac-
cessed 07.02.2018]. 
OECD. 2000. OECD Joint workshop on extended producer responsibility and waste min-
imisation policy in support of environmental sustainability. 
OECD. 2013. Competition Issues in the Food Chain Industry. DAF/COMP(2014)16. Paris 
(France): OECD. 
Osoro Cangas, C., Bygrave, K. 2016. Inventory and evaluation of effectiveness of ex-
isting approaches. Determine context and success factors of voluntary alliances. Horizon 
2020 REFRESH. 
Palladino, G. 2017. Interview with Giuseppe Palladino, UNIBO. October 30, 2017. 
REFRESH. 2017. Appendix 2: Food Waste Figures. https://www.wur.nl/up-
load_mm/8/8/d/01914012-f5d4-46d1-81b0-ad6bc4363e39_Appen-
dix%202%20Food%20Waste%20Figures.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Renda, A., Cafaggi, F., Pelkmans, J., Iamiceli, P., Correia de Brito, A., Bebber, L., Cla-
vel, S., Ruiz Peris, J.I., Estevan, C. 2014. Study on the legal framework covering busi-
ness-to-business unfair trading practices in the retail supply chain. Final report prepared 
for the European Commission, DG Internal Market DG MARKT/2012/049/E. Brussels (Bel-
gium): European Union. 
Rijksoverheid. 2008. Policy document on sustainable food. https://www.rijksover-
heid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/beleidsnota-s/2009/07/29/policy-document-
on-sustainable-food/29072009notaduurzaamvoedsel-engels.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Ronstadt, R. 1993. The Art of Case Analysis: A Guide to the Diagnosis of Business Situ-
ations (2nd Ed.). London (UK): Lord Publishing.  
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
78 
Salo, E. 2016. Voluntary agreements for the achievement of sustainable development 
goals : Dutch Green Deals and WRAP agreements. https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/han-
dle/123456789/52151 [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Scholz, R.W., and Tietje, O. 2002. Embedded Case Study Methods. Integrating Quanti-
tative and Qualitative Knowledge. Thousand Oaks (USA): SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Seely, A. 2015. Supermarkets: the Groceries Code Adjudicator. House of Commons Li-
brary Briefing Paper number 6124. 
SFA. 2017a. Agenda 2017-2020 Sustainable Food Alliance. 
SFA. 2017b. Links in the chain. Sustainable Food Alliance. http://www.duurza-
mereten.nl/over-ons/schakels.html [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
SFA. 2017c. Raw materials and residual flows. Sustainable Food Alliance. 
http://www.duurzamereten.nl/themas/detail/grondstoffen-en-reststromen [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 
SFA. 2017d. Sustainable Food Alliance. http://www.verduurzamingvoedsel.nl/over-
ons/over-alliantie-verduurzaming-voedsel.html [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Sikkema, A. 2017, December 7. Minister Kaag in Wageningen.                                       
https://resource.wur.nl/nl/organisatie/show/Minister-Kaag-in-Wageningen-.htm [Ac-
cessed 07.02.2018]. 
Snels, J. 2017. CARVE; Innovative project to combat food waste in the agri-food chain. 
https://www.wur.nl/en/project/CARVE-Innovative-project-to-combat-food-waste-in-the-
agri-food-chain.htm [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Soethoudt, H., Timmermans, T. 2013. Food Waste Monitor (No. 1372). Wageningen UR 
Food & Biobased Research. http://www.nowastenetwork.nl/wp-content/up-
loads/Food_waste_monitor_ENG_Dec_2013.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Stake, R. 1995. The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks (USA): SAGE Publica-
tions, Inc. 
Stefanelli, J., Marsden, P. 2012. Models of Enforcement in Europe for Relations in the 
Food Supply Chain. British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
Stenmarck, Å., Jensen, C, Quested, T., Moates, G. 2016. Estimates of European food 
waste levels. Stockholm (Sweden): IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute. 
Sustainable Food Alliance. 2017. About the Sustainable Food Alliance. http://duurza-
mereten.nl/over-ons/over-alliantie-verduurzaming-voedsel.html [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Tellis, W.M. 1997. “Introduction to Case Study.” The Qualitative Report, 3(2), 1-14. 
The Grocer. 2017. Forecast and promo failures driving waste warns Tacon. 24 Novem-
ber 2017. https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/home/topics/waste-not-want-not/forecast-and-
promo-failures-driving-waste-warns-tacon/560504.article [Accessed 15.03.2018]. 
Timmermans, T. 2017a, January 26. Dutch Taskforce connects initiatives against food 
waste. Wageningen University & Research. https://www.wur.nl/en/newsarticle/Dutch-
Taskforce-connects-initiatives-against-food-waste.htm [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Timmermans, T. 2017b. Interview with Toine Timmermans, Wageningen U&R. Septem-
ber 22, 2017. 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
79 
Verburg, G. 2008. Policy Document on Sustainable Food. Ministry of Agriculture Nature 
and Food Quality. 
Vidal, J. 2005. More than 30% of our food is thrown away - and it’s costing billions a 
year. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk_news/story/0,,1460183,00.html 
[Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Vittuari, M., Gaiani, S., Politano, A., Aramyan, L., Gheoldus, M., Schneider, F. 2015. 
Review of current EU Member States legislation and policies addressing food waste. FP7 
FUSIONS. Bologna (Italy): University of Bologna. 
WRAP. 2009. WRAP’s Halving Waste to Landfill agreement crosses the border as first 
Scottish council signs up. WRAP UK. http://www.wrap.org.uk/con-
tent/wrap%E2%80%99s-halving-waste-landfill-agreement-crosses-border-first-scottish-
council-signs [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2010a. Courtauld commitment phase 1 signatories household packaging optimi-
sation & food waste 2005-2010. http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Cour-
tauld%20Commitment%20signatories%20list,%203%20Mar%2010.pdf [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2010b. Evaluation of Courtauld Food Waste Target – Phase 1. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Evaluation%20of%20Cour-
tauld%201%20Food%20Waste%20Target%20final.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2012. Courtauld Commitment 2 – signatory case studies | WRAP UK. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/courtauld-commitment-2-%E2%80%93-signatory-case-
studies [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2013a. Courtauld Commitment 2 Packaging and Supply Chain Waste. Banbury, 
Oxon, UK: Waste & Resources Action Programme. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Courtauld%20Commitment%202%20Packag-
ing%20and%20Supply%20Chain%20Waste.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2013b. The Courtauld Commitment. http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/what-is-
courtauld [Accessed 19.04.2017]. 
WRAP. 2013c. Information sheet - The Courtauld Commitment. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Courtauld%20information%20sheet.pdf [Ac-
cessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2013d, April 23. The Courtauld Commitment | WRAP UK. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/what-is-courtauld [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2013e, April 26. Courtauld Commitment 1 | WRAP UK. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/courtauld-commitment-1 [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2014. Courtauld Commitment 3 Signatories. WRAP. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/CC3%20signatories%20list%20Octo-
ber%202014.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2015. Courtauld Commitment 3: Delivering action on waste. Banbury, Oxon, 
UK: WRAP. http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/courtauld-commitment-3-delivering-action-
waste [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2016a, March 10. The Courtauld Commitment 2025. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/courtauld-commitment-2025 [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
 
D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
80 
WRAP. 2016b, March 10. What is Courtauld 2025? http://www.wrap.org.uk/con-
tent/what-courtauld-2025 [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2016c, March 14. The Courtauld Commitment 2025 to Transform UK Food and 
Drink. http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/courtauld-commitment-2025-transform-uk-food-
and-drink [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2016d, March 16. Courtauld Commitment 2025 Signatories. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/courtauld-commitment-2025-signatories [Accessed 
07.02.2018]. 
WRAP. 2016e, October 10. Courtauld Commitment 3 | WRAP UK. 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/courtauld-commitment-3 [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
WUR. 2017. Partners Taskforce Circular Economy in Food. Wageningen University & 
Research. https://www.wur.nl/upload_mm/9/e/d/3a4733ff-17de-4e14-b2a1-
03c4021d34ab_Bijlage%201%20Deelnemers%20Taskforce%20Circular%20Econ-
omy%20in%20Food.pdf [Accessed 07.02.2018]. 
Yin, R.K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design & Methods. Thousand Oaks (USA): SAGE 
Publications, Inc. 
YouGov. 2017. GCA – Annual Survey Results 2017. https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/623564/GCA_Annual_Sector_Sur-
vey_Results.pdf [Accessed 09.02.2018]. 
Zero Waste Scotland. 2016. Zero Waste Scotland welcomes bold new targets on food 





D3.2 – Unfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: a 
policy assessment in select EU Member States 
81 
 
8   Appendix 1 
8.1 Background on case study research 
The history of case study research is marked by periods of intense use and of disuse 
(Tellis 1997). Due to the controversial consideration by the academic world, case 
studies have been stereotyped as a “weak sibling” among social research methods 
for a long period (and in part also today) (Yin 2003). Nevertheless, they represent 
an effective tool to analyse complex interactions within a defined context, like a 
mix of policies affecting a specific issue. This is particularly true when, due to the 
recent entry into force of the policies, and the impossibility to carry out randomised 
control trials, quantitative analyses and/or systematic monitoring are not feasible. 
Case studies consist of detailed contextual analyses of a limited number of events 
or conditions and their relationships. Researchers have used the case study method 
for many years across a variety of disciplines. Social scientists, in particular, have 
made wide use of this qualitative research method to examine contemporary real-
life situations and provide the basis for the application of ideas and extension of 
methods. Yin (2003, p. 23) defines the case study method as “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used”.  
Literature provides several examples of use of case studies. Case studies can be 
holistic or embedded, single case, or multiple cases (Ibid). A case study can be 
defined as holistic when it is shaped by a thoroughly qualitative approach relying 
on narrative, phenomenological descriptions; embedded ones involve more than 
one object of analysis and are not limited to qualitative analysis alone (Ibid).  
A further important distinction is between single and multiple case studies (Ibid). 
On one hand, single cases are used to confirm or challenge a theory, or to represent 
a unique or extreme case; on the other hand, multiple cases follow a replication logic 
(Ibid). This is not to be confused with the sampling logic, where a selection is made 
out of a population for inclusion in the study. This type of sample selection is im-
proper in a case study, as each individual case consists of a "whole" study, in which 
facts are gathered from various sources, and conclusions drawn on those facts.  
Stake (1995) identifies intrinsic and instrumental case studies, where intrinsic ones 
are characterised by a need for information on a particular case, and instrumental 
ones are characterised by an objective that is something other than understanding 
the specific case (e.g. scientific or financial objectives). In Task 3.1.2, instrumental 
case studies will be used, as the final goal is to understand the impact on food 
waste of UTPs and VAs beyond the specific country contexts. 
A further classification could be based on the epistemological status. Following Yin 
(2003), it is possible to identify exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive case stud-
ies. In exploratory case studies, fieldwork and data collection may be undertaken 
prior to definition of the research questions and hypotheses. This type of study has 
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been considered as a prelude to some social research. Explanatory cases are suit-
able for doing causal analyses. Descriptive cases require that the investigator be-
gins with a descriptive theory, or faces the possibility that problems occur during 
the project. The type of case study used within T3.1.2 is of the explanatory type. 
A case study can be used for different purposes: as a research method, as a teach-
ing method, or as an action/application (Scholz and Tietje 2002). A further dimen-
sion relates to the gathering of data. Many authors (Stake 1995; Scholz and Tietje 
2002; Yin 2003) agree that case studies should rely on multiple sources of infor-
mation. Methods include direct and indirect participant observation, structured in-
terviews and surveys, as well as experimental design, focused interviews, open-
ended interviews, archival records, documents and scientific data from field, and 
laboratory experiments (Ibid). 
Ronstadt (1993) describes four basic formats for case studies: highly structured, 
short vignettes, unstructured, or ground-breaking. A highly structured case is char-
acterised by the use of known methods, and an extensive written report, and “best 
solutions” often exist; short vignettes are characterized by a well-structured case 
with excess of information where a “best solution” does not usually exist. Unstruc-
tured cases do not present a “best solution”, although a preferred practice or theory 
may exist. Ground-breaking cases provide new terrain for studies through com-
pletely new situations. Here, either highly structured case studies or short vignettes 
will be used, depending on the topic and the country, as in some cases no ad hoc 
policy has been implemented yet and no “best solution” can be identified. 
Finally, as for the synthesis process, it is possible to identify two different strategies: 
informal, empathic or intuitive (which avoids reductionism and elementarism, and 
is preferred when the design is holistic), and formative or method driven (where the 
conclusions are supported by the methods chosen, which is preferred for embedded 
case studies) (Scholz and Tietje 2002). Here, informal synthesis processes will be 
preferred, due to the use of qualitative methods, the high complexity of the policy 
mix, and the large cross-country differences. 
Table 6. Classifications of the case studies and approaches used within T3.1.2. 
Decision node  Options related to the node 
Design 
Holistic or embedded 
Single case or multiple cases 
Motivation Intrinsic or instrumental 
Epistemological status Exploratory, descriptive or explanatory 
Purpose Research/teaching or action/application 
Data Quantitative or qualitative 
Format 
Highly structured, short vignettes 
Unstructured or ground-breaking 
Synthesis 
Informal, empathic, or intuitive 
Formative, or method driven 
Source: Scholz and Tietje (2002). 
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8.2 Case study research: some operational elements 
Most authors (Stake 1995; Scholz and Tietje 2002; Yin 2003) agree that case stud-
ies should use multiple sources of information and diversified research tools. Meth-
ods may include direct and indirect participant observation, structured interviews 
and surveys, experimental design, focused interviews, open-ended interviews, ar-
chival records, documents and scientific data from field and/or laboratory. The most 
methodological approaches usable within the case study Task 3.1.2 are the analysis 
of literature and documents (primary/secondary sources), focused/open-ended in-
terviews with key stakeholders (food businesses, policymakers, etc.) as well as the 
analysis of survey data (if these are already available). 
Yin (2003) suggests case studies to be based on a protocol/structure, and designed 
by taking into consideration different components, including a clear research ques-
tion/problem, propositions, a unit of analysis, a logic linking data to propositions, 
and criteria for interpreting the findings. The protocol for the case studies of Task 
3.1.2 is provided below. 
The design phase is particularly important to structure the study, ensuring its con-
struct, internal and external validity, and reliability. Following Yin (2003) these el-
ements can be defined as follow: 
 construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
studied; 
 internal validity: demonstrating that certain conditions lead to other conditions, 
as well as requiring the use of multiple pieces of evidence from multiple sources 
to uncover convergent lines of inquiry; 
 external validity: establishing the domain to which findings can be generalized; 
 reliability: it refers to the stability, accuracy, and precision of measurement and 
data collection. 
 
